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My dissertation is about the following two questions:
The causal question: When is something a cause of something else?
The moral question: When is someone morally responsible for something?
I examine the way in which these questions overlap. I argue that, in some important respects, the relation
between the causal and the moral question is tighter than people have taken it to be, but, in other
important respects, it is looser than people have taken it to be.
The dissertation consists of three chapters. Each of the chapters is a self-contained paper, but the
three papers are interconnected in various ways. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with how the causal
question and the moral question intersect, and Chapter 3 is concerned with how they come apart.
In Chapter 1, I lay out a view of causation according to which causing is a particular way of
making a difference. I show that an advantage of this view is that it carves up a concept of cause that is
particularly well suited for the work causation does in moral theory.
In Chapter 2, I argue that a moral asymmetry that exists between actions and omissions has a
causal basis. I argue that the conditions under which actions and omissions make us morally responsible
are different, and that this is so because the causal powers of actions and omissions are different.
In Chapter 3, I argue against the received view about the relation between causation and moral
responsibility, according to which being responsible for something requires causing it. I offer an
alternative picture according to which causation is a necessary condition for the transmission of
responsibility, although not for the existence of responsibility itself.
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David Lewis wrote in "Causation:"
We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference
it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it.'
Call this idea, according to which a cause is a "difference-maker," the difference-making idea. The
difference-making idea famously motivated Lewis's counterfactual theory, an attempt to analyze the
concept of cause in terms of the relation of counterfactual dependence between events.2
However, as we will see shortly, the counterfactual theory ends up misrepresenting the
difference-making idea: it counts as causes things that aren't difference-makers. We should then look for
an alternative way of spelling out the difference-making idea. This is what I will do in this paper. I will
make a new proposal on how causes are difference-makers, and I will argue that the new proposal
succeeds in capturing the difference-making idea.
Two words of clarification are in order. First, the view that I will defend here is not an analysis
of causation. It sets a constraint on the concept of cause, and thus it helps to carve up the concept, while
at the same time leaving some room for different ways of pinning it down. Second, this paper is an
attempt to establish how best to capture the difference-making idea; it is not-at least, not primarily-a
defense of the claim that we should endorse it. However, at the end of the paper I will point to an
i Lewis (1986a), pp. 160-1.
2 In recent years, Lewis's theory gave rise to an array of revisions and adjustments, all of which attempt to analyze
the concept of causation, ultimately, in terms of counterfactual dependence between events. Two examples are
McDermott (1995) and Lewis himself in his later work, Lewis (2000).
important advantage of endorsing the difference-making idea: I will argue that a concept of cause that
results from embracing it is particularly well suited for the work causation does in moral theory.
2. Two ways of making a difference
I will start by illustrating how the difference-making idea motivated Lewis's counterfactual theory and
how, despite this fact, Lewis's theory failed to capture it. This discussion will then serve to motivate my
own proposal.
On its first pass, Lewis's counterfactual theory (CT) states that a cause is something without
which the effect wouldn't have occurred:
CT (First Pass): C causes E if and only if E counterfactually depends on C,
i.e., if C hadn't happened, then E wouldn't have happened.
That is, a cause makes a difference to its effect iil that the effect wouldn't have occurred without the
cause. This first pass has obvious counterexamples, such as the following:
Assassination: Assassin shoots Victim and, as a result, Victim dies. However,
Backup is waiting in reserve. Had Assassin not shot, Backup would have,
and Victim would still have died (in a very similar way, at around the same time, etc.).
Victim's death (intuitively, the same death) would still have occurred if Assassin hadn't shot; hence, CT
(First Pass) entails that Assassin's shooting wasn't a cause of Victim's death. But, clearly, it was.
In order to get around this problem, Lewis takes the ancestral of counterfactual dependence:
CT (Second Pass): C causes E if and only if there is a chain of
stepwise counterfactual dependence from C to E.3
In Assassination, there is a chain of stepwise counterfactual dependence from Assassin's shooting to
Victim's death, via the intermediate event of Assassin's bullet's heading towards Victim. Assassin's
3 Lewis (1986a), p. 167.
bullet heading towards Victim depends on Assassin's shooting, for, had Assassin not shot, Assassin's
bullet wouldn't have been heading towards Victim. In turn, given that Backup didn't shoot,4 Victim's
death depends on Assassin's bullet's heading towards Victim, for, had Assassin's bullet not been heading
towards Victim, Victim wouldn't have died. Hence, CT (Second Pass) yields the right result: Assassin's
shooting caused Victim's death.
Interestingly, however, this second pass has an important drawback. By letting chains of
dependence in, Lewis counts too many things as causes, including things that, intuitively, don't make a
difference to the effect. Hence the move from the first pass to the second pass is a step away from the
difference-making idea, which originally served to motivate the theory. Consider, for instance, the
following case:
Switch: Victim is stuck on the railroad tracks. A runaway train is hurtling down the
tracks when it approaches a switch. I flip the switch, and the train turns onto a side
track. However, the tracks reconverge a bit further ahead, before the place where
Victim is standing. Victim dies.
Is my flipping the switch a cause of Victim's death? According to CT (Second Pass), it is, for there is a
chain of stepwise counterfactual dependence from my flipping the switch to the death, via the
intermediate event of the train running on the side track. This emerges as follows: The train's running on
the side track depends on my flipping the switch, for, had I not flipped the switch, the train wouldn't have
been running on the side track. In turn, given that the train switched tracks and thus it is no longer on the
main track, Victim's death depends on the train's running on the side track. For, if it hadn't been running
on the side track, then, given that it is not running on the main track, the train would not have reached
Victim and killed him.5 Hence, the train's running on the side track depends on my flipping the switch,
4 According to Lewis, the standard contexts of evaluation of counterfactuals are not "backtracking". Thus, in
considering a counterfactual of the form "If C hadn't occurred, E wouldn't have occurred," we must hold fixed as
much of what happened before C as possible. See Lewis (1986b).
5 Where would have the train gone, then? This depends on the details of our theory of counterfactuals. Maybe it
would have derailed, or it would have miraculously vanished. In any case, it is clear that it wouldn't have reached
Victim, given that Victim could only be reached via one of the tracks.
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and Victim's death depends, in turn, on the train's running on the side track. As a result, CT (Second
Pass) entails that my flipping the switch caused Victim's death in Switch. However, this result clashes
with the difference-making idea: intuitively, my flipping the switch did not make a difference to Victim's
death. To be sure, it made some difference, e.g., it made the death happen via the train's running on the
side track. But, intuitively, this is a difference that does not matter causally.6
It might be objected that our causal intuitions about Switch are morally tainted: that our intuitive
verdict about Switch arises from a confusion between what I am causally responsible for and what I am
morally responsible for. Clearly, I am not morally responsible for the death in virtue of having flipped the
switch. Thus, since it is hard to keep the moral intuition apart from the causal intuition, it is natural to
think that I don't cause the death by flipping the switch. But I might cause it without being morally
responsible for it; after all, we cause many things that we are not morally responsible for.
However, we can address this worry by imagining a variant of the case where no moral agents are
involved. Imagine, for instance, that what flipped the switch is a gust of wind, and what was lying on the
track up ahead is an apple. This doesn't change our causal intuitions: it still seems that the flipping of the
switch isn't a cause of the outcome-in this case, the squashing of the apple. This suggests that our
intuition that my flipping the switch didn't cause the death in Swvitch is genuinely causal, not merely
moral.7
We have seen that CT does not succeed in fully capturing the difference-making idea: its second
pass (to which one can be naturally driven upon realizing that the first pass has clear counterexamples)
counts as causes things that, intuitively, don't make a difference to the ensuing outcomes. In particular,
6 Lewis's most recent attempt, the "causation as influence" view (in Lewis (2000)), has the same kind of problem.
For there Lewis analyzes causation as the ancestral of the influence relation. As a result, he counts as causes things
that, intuitively, make no difference to the effects.
7 For attempts to rescue the intuition that my flipping the switch isn't a cause in cases of this sort, see Rowe (1989),
and Yablo (2002) and (forthcoming). I do not wish to suggest, however, that these authors would agree with the
proposal I will offer shortly.
we have seen that, in Switch, the flip doesn't seem to make a difference to Victim's death. However, CT
counts the flip as a cause of the death.
So we should look for a new way to capture the difference-making idea. I propose that we start
by focusing on Switch, where CT failed. One thing that catches the eye about Switch is that, just as the
flip doesn't make a difference to the death, the failure toflip wouldn't have made a difference to the death
either. In other words, whether or not I flip the switch doesn't make a difference to the death; it only
helps to determine the route that the train takes before reaching Victim. This suggests that what might be
missing in Switch is some kind of asymmetry between my flipping the switch and my failing to flip the
switch. Maybe the reason that my flipping the switch doesn't make a difference is that the contribution
that it makes is not more important than the contribution that its absence would have made. Maybe, for
something to be a cause, it must make a contribution that somehow outweighs the contribution that its
absence would have made.
How could we make this thought more precise? Here is a natural suggestion. Causes are
difference-makers in that the following principle, the Causes as Difference-Makers principle, is true:
CDM: If C caused E, then the absence of C wouldn't have caused E.
According to CDM, a cause contributes more to the effect than its absence would have contributed to it in
that the absence of the cause wouldn't have been a cause itself.8
Consider what CDM would say about Switch. I have pointed out that, intuitively, the
contributions that the flip made and that the failure to flip would have made are on a par. Hence, it is
likely that, were we to count the flip as a cause, we would also have to count the failure to flip as a cause.9
But CDM doesn't allow this. So, CDM would entail that the flip isn't a cause. As a result, CDM would
help explain our reluctance to count the flip as a cause of the death in Switch.
8 I intend this to apply to both "positive" and "negative" causes. For instance, C could be an omission, in which
case the absence of C would be an action (more on this below).
9 On the assumption that there is causation by omission. I discuss this assumption shortly.
I will argue that CDM succeeds in capturing the difference-making idea. The rest of this paper is
concerned with clarifying the content of CDM, arguing for its truth, and examining its most important
consequences. First, however, let me briefly compare CDM with CT.
An important difference between CDM and CT is that, unlike CT, CDM cannot be regarded as a
reductive analysis of causation, i.e. as an analysis of the concept of cause in purely non-causal terms.
CDM is, rather, a constraint on theories of causation: a condition that the true analysis of causation (if
there is such a thing) would have to meet. Another important difference between CDM and CT is in the
way each attempts to capture the difference-making idea. We have seen that CT attempts to cash out the
difference-making idea in terms of the relation of counterfactual dependence between events. According
to CT, a cause makes a difference in that, if it hadn't occurred, then some event intimately related to the
effect wouldn't have occurred. (On the first pass, the effect itself wouldn't have occurred; on the second
pass, some event in the chain of events leading to the effect wouldn't have occurred.) According to CDM,
a cause makes a difference by determining, not the events that occur in the actual and counterfactual
scenarios, but the causal relations that obtain in the actual and counterfactual scenarios: whether a cause
occurs makes a difference to whether there is a causal relation linking an event or its absence (according
as the event is present or absent) to the effect.
3. Events, absences, and the stringency of CDM's demands
In this section I explain the content of CDM in more detail and I illustrate with examples. In the next two
sections I lay out my argument for CDM.
I will be assuming that absences can be causes, or, as it is sometimes put, that there is causation
by omission. This is a reasonable assumption. Intuition dictates that there is causation by omission
(intuitively, the absence of rain can cause a drought, and a mother's failure to feed her child can cause the
child's death), and the majority of philosophers have followed intuition on this score. This is not to say
that the assumption that there is causation by omission is trouble-free; there are problems generated by
letting omissions be causes, but saying that causation by omission is impossible still seems like an
overreaction to such problems.' 0 The assumption that there is causation by omission prevents CDM from
being trivially true. If there were no causation by omission, then, clearly, it could never be the case that
both an event and its absence would have caused the same effect in the scenarios where they obtain,
simply because an event's absence could never cause anything.
With this assumption in place, let us examine in more detail what CDM says. On the one hand,
CDM makes a claim about how the causal powers of events constrain the causal powers of the
corresponding absences. Suppose that I write a letter to my mother and that makes her happy. Then
CDM claims that, given that my writing her a letter caused her to be happy, my failure to write to her
wouldn't have caused her to be happy. This is to say, had I not written a letter to my mother, my failure to
write to her wouldn't have caused her to be happy.
Some words of clarification are in order. First, what is a failure? In particular, what is my failure
to write a letter to my mother? I will adopt a common convention according to which a failure is the
failure of any event of a certain type to occur." On this view, the failure to write a letter to my mother
obtains just in case no event of a certain type-a writing a letter to my mother by me, at a certain time, or
within a certain interval of time--occurs. More generally, if C is an event, then the absence of C obtains
just in case no C-type event occurs. In a case of this sort, where C is an event, CDM claims that, if C
caused E, then, had no C-type event occurred, the failure of a C-type event to occur wouldn't have caused
E.
Second, how should we understand the counterfactual claims that CDM makes? In particular,
how should we understand the claim: "Given that C caused E, had no C-type event occurred, then the
failure of a C-type event to occur wouldn't have caused E"? We can interpret it in the standard way, i.e.
10 Causation by o,' ission would be a problem if, for instance, one believed that the causal relata are events. For, on
many views, omissions aren't events. On the other hand, it is important to allow for causation by omission in order
to preserve the important connection that seems to exist between causation and moral responsibility. If a mother
doesn't feed her baby, it seems that she is morally responsible for the baby's death in virtue of having caused his
death by not feeding him. But this is causation by omission. For discussion of causation by omission, see Dowe
(2001), McGrath (ms) and Thomson (2003).
" See, e.g., Lewis (1986a), p. 189.
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by appeal to possible-worlds semantics. Take the closest possible world where no C-type event occurs;
that is a world where the failure of a C-type event to occur obtains. What CDM says is that the failure of
a C-type event to occur doesn't cause E in that world, given that C caused E in the actual world.
Now, CDM also makes a claim about how the causal powers of absences constrain the causal
powers of certain specific events. Suppose that I fail to phone Grandma on her birthday and this makes
her sad. Then CDM claims that, given that my failure to phone Grandma on her birthday caused her to be
sad, had I phoned her on her birthday, my phoning her wouldn't have caused her to be sad. Again, we can
interpret this in terms of possible worlds. Take the closest possible world where I phone Grandma. CDM
says that, in that world, my phoning Grandma doesn't cause her to be sad. More generally, if C is the
failure of an event of a certain type to occur, i.e. an absence, then CDM claims that, if C caused E, then,
had an event of the relevant type been present, it wouldn't have caused E. This is to say, in the closest
possible world where an event of that type occurs, that event doesnt cause E, given that the absence of an
event of that type caused E in the actual world.
I have explained the content of CDM in some detail. Now I will discuss its force. CDM imposes
a constraint on theories of causation. How hard is it for a theory of causation to comply with CDM?
The most interesting and controversial claim that CDM makes concerns outcomes that would still
have occurred in the absence of the cause, i.e., cases where the outcome doesn't counterfactually depend
on the cause. In cases where the outcome counterfactually depends on the cause, CDM is met in a
straightforward way. To see this, imagine that Assassin shoots and, as a result, Victim dies. However,
had Assassin failed to shoot, Victim would have lived. Then it is trivially true that, whereas Assassin's
shooting caused Victim's death, Assassin's failing to shoot wouldn't have caused Victim's death: it
wouldn't have caused the death because the death wouldn't have occurred if Assassin had failed to shoot.
So, in order to measure the stringency of CDM's demands, we must focus on cases where the
outcome doesn't counterfactually depend on the cause. The question then becomes: How hard is it to
meet CDM's demands in those cases? I will show that it is quite hard. As a matter of fact, coming up
with a theory of causation that complies with CDM is no easy task.' 2 By way of example, I will briefly
review two different types of theories of causation and I will show that they both fail to meet CDM.
A first type of theory that clashes with CDM is a type of theory according to which helping to
determine the causal route to an effect is sufficient for causing the effect.' 3 When I flip the switch in
Switch, my flipping the switch makes the train run on the side track before it reaches Victim; hence, it
contributes to determining the causal route to Victim's death. So a theory of the type we are envisaging
entails that my flipping the switch causes the death. However, had I failed to flip the switch, my failure to
flip the switch would also have contributed to determining the causal route to the death, for it would have
made the train run on the main track before it reached Victim. So a theory of this type would also entail
that, had I failed to flip the switch, my failure to flip the switch would have been a cause of the death. In
other words, according to a theory of this type, no matter what I did in Switch, I would have caused the
death. This contradicts CDM.
A second type of theory of causation that fails to comply with CDM is a classical "regularity"
view, such as Mackie's view.14 According to Mackie, C is a cause of E just in case there is a set of
occurring conditions containing C that, when conjoined with some lawful regularity, entails E, and that
doesn't entail E when C is removed from the set. Consider what this view would say about
Assassination. In Assassination, given that Assassin shot, there is a set of occurring conditions containing
the fact that Assassin shot that, when conjoined with some lawful regularity, entails the fact that Victim
died, but that doesn't entail this when the fact that Assassin shot is removed from the set. This set of
conditions includes, for instance, the fact that Assassin's gun had working bullets, the fact that it was
12 A theory that clearly meets CDM is CT (First Pass). On this view, if C is a cause of E, then E wouldn't have
occurred in C's absence; hence, it is clear that the absence of C wouldn't have caused E. However, as we have seen,
there are clear counterexamples to this view. As a result, no one seems to hold it.
13 An example of a theory of this type is CT (Second Pass).
14 Mackie (1993). See, in particular, the example on p. 43. There Mackie seems to suggest that his view has the
consequence that it is possible for the fact that an event occurs to cause an outcome when the fact that the event
doesn't occur would also have caused it. (Notice that, for Mackie, the causal relata are facts, not events. But
nothing essential hangs on this.)
aimed at Victim, etc. Hence, Mackie's view would say that Assassin's shooting was a cause of Victim's
death. But now imagine that Assassin hadn't shot, in which case Backup would have shot. Then there
would have been a set of occurring conditions containing the fact that Assassin didn't shoot that, when
conjoined with some lawful regularity, entails the fact that Victim died, but that doesn't entail this when
the fact that Assassin didn't shoot is removed from the set.' 5 This set of conditions includes, for instance,
the fact that Backup intended to shoot just in case Assassin didn't shoot, the fact that Backup's gun had
working bullets, etc. Hence, Mackie's view would say that Assassin's shooting caused the death but, had
Assassin not shot, his failure to shoot would also have caused the death. This contradicts CDM.
We have seen that CDM imposes a highly demanding constraint on theories of causation; by way
of example, I have shown that two importantly different types of theories of causation fail to comply with
it. In what follows, I argue that CDM succeeds in capturing the difference-making idea. Hence, if we are
to respect the difference-making idea, we should reject any theory of causation that fails to comply with
CDM.
4. Argument for CDM (Part I)
I will argue for CDM by showing that the best candidate counterexamples to CDM are not genuine
counterexamples. I will look at two paradigm cases where it is most plausible to think that both an event
and its absence would have caused an outcome, and I will argue that they fail. Since they fail, and since
they are the best attempts at counterexamples, I will conclude that there is good reason to believe that
CDM is true.
For ease of exposition, I will focus on the specific claim that CDM makes about actions and
omissions of agents, but the argument is intended to have full generality. When restricted to actions and
omissions of agents, CDM reads:
15 This last part is true because Backup wouldn't have shot unless he saw that Assassin didn't shoot.
CDM (A/O): If an agent's acting in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent failed to act
that way, the agent's failing to act that way wouldn't have caused E and, vice-
versa, if an agent's failing to act in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent
acted that way, the agent's acting that way wouldn't have caused E.
A counterexample to CDM (A/O) would have to be a case where, in the scenario where the agent acts in
the relevant way, the agent's action causes an outcome E and, also, in the scenario where the agent doesn't
act in the relevant way, the agent's omission causes E.
Let us single out, in particular, the following three desiderata that a counterexample to CDM
(A/O) would have to meet. First, the two causes must be an action and an omission by an agent (as
opposed to another action by the same agent). Second, the action and the omission must be properly
aligned, that is, the omission in question must be the failure to act in the way that caused or would have
caused E. This is to say, if one of the causes is the agent's ýp-ing, then the other cause must be the agent's
failing to (p (as opposed to, say, the agent's failure to i). Third, the action and the omission must be such
that, in the scenarios where they obtain, they cause the same token outcome, not just outcomes of the
same type. 16
Is it possible to find a case that meets these three desiderata? In what follows, I look at two
examples. The first example I will consider is Assassination. Once again, here is the case:
Assassination: Assassin shoots Victim and, as a result, Victim dies. However,
Backup is waiting in reserve. Had Assassin not shot, Backup would have,
and Victim would still have died (in a very similar way, at around the same time, etc.).
One might believe that this is a counterexample to CDM (A/O) because one might reason in the following
way. Assassin's shooting caused Victim's death. However, had Assassin not shot, his failure to shoot
would have caused Backup to shoot, and Backup's shooting would have in turn caused Victim's death. It
follows by transitivity that Assassin's failure to shoot would also have caused Victim's death.
16 These desiderata help distinguish CDM from clearly false theses in the vicinity. For instance, the claim that there
cannot be more than one way to cause an outcome, and the claim that it is impossible for an action and the
corresponding omission to cause outcomes of the same type.
In particular, one might think that Assassination meets the three desiderata. For, first, Backup
would have acted as a result of one of Assassin's omissions. Second, the omission that Backup would
have acted as a result of is precisely Assassin's failure to shoot, that is, the omission corresponding to the
action that caused the death in the actual scenario. And third, Victim's death would have occurred in very
much the same way if Assassin had shot or if he hadn't. Hence, the death if Assassin had shot and the
death if he hadn't shot are presumably the same death.
In what follows I will argue that Assassination isn't a counterexample to CDM (A/O) because,
while Assassin's shooting caused the death, his failing to shoot would not have caused the death
(although it would have caused Backup to shoot, which would have caused the death). Hence, I will be
arguing that we should reject the transitivity of causation at least in contexts of this type.
Let me pause here for a moment and remind you of the dialectic. This paper started out with an
assumption: the assumption that the difference-making idea is worth pursuing. I said that I would be
arguing that, if we wish to respect the difference-making idea, then we should endorse my view on how to
cash it out (and I said that I would draw attention to an important advantage of embracing the difference-
making idea at the end of the paper). I will now put this assumption to work in the following way. I will
argue that the assumption that we should respect the difference-making idea is likely to lead us to say that
the transitivity of causation fails in some contexts and, if it fails in those contexts, then it fails in
Assassination. As a result, Assassination fails to be a counterexample to CDM (A/O).' 7
Let me start by reminding you of the following case:
Switch: Victim is stuck on the railroad tracks. A runaway train is hurtling down the
tracks when it approaches a switch. I flip the switch, and the train turns onto a side
track. However, the tracks reconverge a bit further ahead, before the place where
Victim is standing. Victim dies.
17 The assumption that we should respect the difference-making idea plays an important role in my argument
because it is not easy to argue against the transitivity of causation. Merely pointing to seeming counterexamples to
transitivity does not seem to be enough, for the view that causation is transitive seems to be deeply entrenched in our
way of thinking. When we look for the causes of a given event, we often proceed by tracing a causal chain back to
earlier events and concluding that those earlier events are causes of the later event. This method assumes that
causation is transitive. For discussion of transitivity, see Hall (2000) and (forthcoming), Hitchcock (2001), Paul(2000), and Yablo (2002) and (forthcoming).
In section 2, 1 pointed out that, to the extent that we wish to respect the difference-making idea, we should
say that the flip isn't a cause of the death in Switch. For, intuitively, the flip didn't make a difference to
the death.
Now, on the assumption that the flip isn't a cause in Switch, it seems that it isn't a cause in the
following variant of Switch either:
Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected: Again, I am by the switch but this time I see that part of
the side track is disconnected. I think that I can make the train derail by turning it onto the side
track. Hence, I flip the switch and the train turns. However, Backup is waiting by the side track.
When he sees that I flip the switch, he rapidly reconnects the side track. The train runs on the
side track for a while, then on the main track again, and finally kills Victim.
If anything, we feel even more reluctant to say that my flipping the switch is a cause of Victim's death in
this case, where the side track was disconnected when I flipped the switch.
Notice that my claim about Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected is a conditional claim. What I
am suggesting is that, if we said that the flip isn't a cause in Switch, then we would have to say that it isn't
a cause in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected. We might be prepared to say that the flip is a cause in
Switch if, for instance, we held the view that determining the route to an event is sufficient for causing an
event (which requires giving up the difference-making idea). If we held this view, then we would want to
say that the flip is also a cause in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected, since, in this case too, the flip
determines the route to the death. My claim is only that, on the assumption that the flip isn't a cause in
Switch, as the difference-making idea dictates, it is even more clearly not a cause in Switch-with-Side-
Track-Disconnected.
Let me also stress that my claim about Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected is a purely causal
claim and, as such, it is independent of any moral considerations. Just as we did with Switch in section 2,
we can see that the intuitions about Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected are genuinely causal, and not
merely moral, by imagining a similar scenario deprived of moral agents. Imagine, again, that what causes
the switch to be flipped is a gust of wind, what reconnects the side track is a mechanism that is
automatically triggered when the switch is flipped, and what is lying on the tracks, and gets squashed by
the train, is an apple. Still, we feel that, if the flipping of the switch isn't a cause of the outcome in
Switch, where the side track was connected all along, then it is even more clearly not a cause in Swiich-
with-Side-Track-Disconnected, where the side track had to be reconnected in order for the train to reach
the apple.
Now, the following also seems to be true about Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected: my
flipping the switch caused Backup to reconnect the side track, and the reconnection of the track by
Backup caused, in turn, Victim's death. It is intuitively clear that my flipping the switch caused the
reconnection of the track by Backup, for the flip was the event that triggered that kind of behavior in
Backup: Backup was determined to reconnect the side track just in case I flipped the switch, and he acted
on that decision. And it is also intuitively clear that Backup's reconnecting the side track caused Victim's
death, for the death would easily have been prevented otherwise: by reconnecting the track, Backup
ensured that the death happened. Hence, my flipping the switch caused Backup to reconnect the side
track, and Backup's reconnecting the side track caused Victim's death; however, on the standing
assumptions about Switch and difference-making, my flipping the switch didn't cause Victim's death.
This is to say, on the standing assumptions about Switch and difference-making, transitivity fails in
Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected.' 8
I have argued that the assumption that we should respect the difference-making idea leads to the
rejection of the transitivity of causation. For the difference-making idea dictates that my flipping the
switch didn't cause Victim's death in Switch. Now, if my flipping the switch didn't cause Victim's death
in Switch, then it probably didn't cause it in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected either. But then it
18 For some people, the failure of transitivity would arise earlier in my argument, in Switch itself. This would be so
if we believed that, while my flipping the switch didn't cause the death, it caused the train to run on the side track,
which caused the death. However, we needn't say this about Switch. Maybe what my flipping the switch caused
wasn't what caused the death. Maybe what caused the death was the event of the train's running towards Victim, and
what my flipping the switch caused was the fact that such an event had a certain feature, or the fact that it happened
in a certain way, i.e., the fact that it happened on the side track. L. Paul rebuts some alleged counterexamples to
transitivity in this way in Paul (2000) (see also Thomson (2003)). Notice, however, that Switch-with-Side-Track-
Disconnected doesn't seem to be open to the same treatment: it seems clear that my flipping the switch caused
Backup to reconnect the track, and that this caused the death.
seems that we should say that, in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected, my flipping the switch caused
Backup to reconnect the side track, which caused the death, but my flipping the switch didn't cause the
death. In what follows, I argue that the scenario where Assassin fails to shoot in Assassination is on a par
with the scenario where I flip the switch in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected. Hence, if transitivity
fails in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected when I flip the switch, it also fails in Assassination when
Assassin fails to shoot.
I have pointed out that my flipping the switch is even more clearly not a cause of Victim's death
in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected than in the original case, Switch. Why is this? Intuitively, this
is because my flipping the switch only made it more difficult for the death to happen, by calling for
Backup's intervention. Given that I flipped the switch, Backup had to intervene or else the death
wouldn't have happened, while, had I not flipped the switch, the death would have occurred much more
easily, without the need for Backup's intervention.' 9 Now, I will argue that the relation between
Assassin's failure to shoot and Victim's death in Assassination is significantly similar to the relation
between my flipping the switch and Victim's death in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected. Hence, if
my flipping the switch did not cause the death in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected, Assassin's
failure to shoot wouldn't have caused the death in Assassination.
To see this, imagine that Assassin failed to shoot in Assassination. So Backup shot, and Victim
died. Then, just as in Switch-with-Side-Track-Disconnected, Assassin's failure to shoot only made it
more difficult for Victim's death to happen, by calling for Backup's intervention. Given that Assassin
didn't shoot, Backup had to intervene or else the death wouldn't have happened, while, had Assassin shot,
the death would have occurred much more easily, without the need for Backup's intervention. This
suggests that the same reasons that should lead us to reject transitivity in Switch-with-Side-Track-
19 Here is another example in the same vein. While swimming in the sea, a child is attacked by a shark. The child
is then rushed to a hospital, where he is treated for a few days, until his wounds heal. Intuitively, the shark attack
caused the medical treatment, the medical treatment caused the child's good health, but the shark attack did not
cause the good health. This is so because, intuitively, the shark attack only made it more difficult for the child's
good health to ensue, given that it introduced the need for the medical treatment.
Disconnected (in the scenario where I flip the switch) should also lead us to reject transitivity in
Assassination (in the scenario where Assassin fails to shoot). They should lead us to say that, while
Assassin's failure to shoot would have caused Backup to shoot, and while Backup's shooting would have
caused Victim's death, Assassin's failure to shoot would not have caused Victim's death. If so,
Assassination fails to be a counterexample to CDM (A/O) because it is not true that both Assassin's
shooting and Assassin's failing to shoot would have caused Victim's death.
My diagnosis of Assassination can be generalized to cases of the following sort. An agent's
action and the corresponding omission would both have been followed by a certain outcome E. The
agent's action is the sort of action that normally leads to outcomes of E's type, and in the actual case it
leads to the outcome in the normal way. The agent's omission, by contrast, is the sort of omission that
could only lead to the outcome via an abnormal route, which contains the intervention of a backup
mechanism without which the outcome wouldn't have occurred. As a result, it seems wrong to count the
omission as a cause of the outcome in the scenario where the omission obtains. Hence, it is not the case
that both the action and the omission would have caused the same outcome. Hence, cases of this type
aren't counterexamples to CDM (A/O). 20
In cases of the type that we have just examined, one of the candidates for being a cause, the
agent's action, has an initial causal advantage over the other candidate, the agent's omission, and thus, it
is a better prima facie candidate for being a cause. But, what about cases where the two candidates are
intuitively on a par? That is, what about cases where neither candidate is a better prima facie candidate
for being a cause? Couldn't cases of this type be counterexamples to CDM (A/O)? I turn to a case of this
type in the next section.
20 In principle, the same style of reasoning should apply to the flipside of this case: a case where the route
containing the action is less straightforward and the route containing the omission is more straightforward.
However, as we will see in chapter 2, I think that there is an asymmetry between actions and omissions in this
respect. I think that, if the outcome would have occurred anyway in the absence of the omission, the omission isn't
a cause, regardless of how straightforward the actual route to the outcome is. I discuss the connections between the
results of this and the next chapter at the end of the next chapter.
5. Argument for CDM (Part II)
Here is such a case:
Two-Assassins: I hired two assassins and I gave them the following instructions. Assassin I is to
shoot Victim just in case I nod at t. Assassin 2 is to shoot Victim just in case I fail to nod at t. As
a matter of fact, I nod at t, Assassin I shoots and Victim dies.
Someone might want to say that this is a counterexample to CDM (A/O) for reasons parallel to those
mentioned in our discussion of Assassination. Namely, my nodding caused Assassin I to shoot, which
caused the death; hence, it is tempting to say that my nodding caused the death. Similarly, my failure to
nod would have caused Assassin 2 to shoot, which would have caused the death; hence, it is tempting to
say that my failure to nod would also have caused the death.
One might also think that Two-Assassins meets the desiderata from the last section. First, the two
candidate causes are an agent's action and an agent's omission. Second, the action and the omission are
properly aligned: Assassin 2 would have shot just in case I failed to nod, where my nodding is precisely
that which made Assassin I shoot in the actual scenario. Third, we can fill in the details of the case so
that the death that Victim would have encountered if Assassin 2 had shot would have been the same death
as the one that he encountered given that Assassin I shot (we can assume that the deaths would have
occurred at around the same time, and in a very similar fashion).
Finally, Two-Assassins is a case where the agent's action and the agent's omission are intuitively
on a par with respect to their causal powers: it seems that one of them is a cause just in case the other is a
cause. Hence, my argument against Assassination from the last section doesn't apply to Two-Assassins.
I will argue that Two-Assassins fails to be a counterexample to CDM (A/O) because (on the
standing assumptions about Switch and difference-making) transitivity fails in this case as well.
However, my diagnosis of Two-Assassins will differ from that of Assassination, in the following way. I
have claimed that, in Assassination, while Assassin's shooting caused the death, his failure to shoot
wouldn't have caused it. By contrast, I will claim that, in Two-Assassins, neither my nodding nor my
failure to nod would have caused the death. This is to say, I will argue that, in a case where the agent's
action and the omission are intuitively on a par, neither is a cause of the outcome.
Again, my argument will be based on an analogy with a variant of Switch. The variant that we
need now is one where, not just one, but the two tracks are initially disconnected:
Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected: This time, both of the tracks are disconnected after the
switch. However, there is one assassin next to each track. If I don't flip the switch, Assassin I
will reconnect the main track and Victim will die. If I flip the switch, Assassin 2 will reconnect
the side track and Victim will die.
Suppose that I flip the switch. Consequently, the train turns onto the side track, which Assassin 2 rapidly
reconnects, then the tracks reconverge, and Victim dies. Did my flip cause the death? If it didn't cause it
in the original case, Switch, it seems that it didn't cause it in this case either. Intuitively, in neither case
did the flip make a difference to the death, for the actual scenario and the scenario where I don't flip the
switch are relevantly parallel: whereas Assassin 2 reconnects the track in the actual case, Assassin I
reconnects the track in the case where I don't flip the switch. Hence, it seems that, if the flip didn't cause
the death in Switch, then it didn't cause the death in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected either. But it
is clear that, in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected, my flipping the switch caused Assassin 2 to
reconnect the side track, which in turn caused the death. Hence, on the standing assumptions about
Switch and difference-making, transitivity fails in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected if I flip the
switch.
Alternatively, suppose that I don't flip the switch. The train then continues along the main track,
which Assassin I rapidly reconnects, and Victim dies. Again, it seems that, if my failure to flip the
switch didn't cause the death in Switch, then it didn't cause it here either, even though it caused Assassin
I to reconnect the track, which in turn caused the death. Thus, on the standing assumptions about Switch
and difference-making, transitivity fails both if I flip the switch and if I don't flip the switch.
Now, Two-Assassins strikes me as on a par with Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected. Just as
neither my flipping the switch nor my failing to flip the switch would have made a difference to Victim's
death in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected, it seems that neither my nodding nor my failing to nod
would have made a difference to Victim's death in Two-Assassins. For, in Two-Assassins too, the
scenario where I nod and the scenario where I fail to nod are relevantly parallel: whereas Assassin 1
shoots in the case where I nod, Assassin 2 shoots in the case where I don't nod. Thus, if neither the flip
nor the failure to flip would have caused the death in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected, then,
similarly, neither my nodding nor my failure to nod would have caused the death in Two-Assassins. My
nodding wouldn't have caused the death, even though it would have caused Assassin 1 to shoot, which
would have caused the death. And my failure to nod wouldn't have caused the death, even though it
would have caused Assassin 2 to shoot, which would have caused the death.
Now, one might find this puzzling. I hired Assassin I and gave him the instruction to shoot just
in case I nodded. How can I say, then, that my nodding wouldn't have caused the death? Similarly, I
hired Assassin 2 and gave him the instruction to shoot just in case I didn't nod. How can I say, then, that
my failure to nod wouldn't have caused the death?
To see that this isn't a problem, imagine that I also hired the two assassins standing by the tracks
in Switch-with-Both-Tracks-Disconnected. Thus, imagine that I gave Assassin I the instruction to
reconnect the main track in case I didn't flip the switch, and Assassin 2 the instruction to reconnect the
side track in case I flipped the switch. This doesn't change the verdict about the causal powers of my
flipping the switch, or of my failure to flip the switch. To be sure, if I hired the two assassins, I caused
the death. But I caused it in virtue of my hiring the two assassins, not in virtue of flipping the switch or
failing to flip it. 21 By hiring the two assassins and giving them the instructions that I gave them, I made
sure that the death would happen. But I also made sure that, at the time when I had to decide whether to
21 How did my hiring the two assassins cause the death? By starting a causal route to the death, which included the
reconnection of the side track by the assassin on that track. Rejecting transitivity is consistent with saying this.
More generally, rejecting transitivity is consistent with saying that, in order for C to be a non-immediate cause of E,
there must be an intermediary, D, that is caused by C and that causes E.
flip the switch or not, what I decided to do then couldn't make a difference. This is to say, I made sure
that nothing I did or failed to do at that moment could count as a cause of the death.22
Similarly, my claim is that, in Two-Assassins, I caused Victim's death but not in virtue of
nodding, or failing to nod. I caused the death by hiring the two assassins and giving them the specific
instructions that I gave them. By hiring the assassins and giving them those instructions, I made sure that
the death would happen, but I also made sure that, at the time when I had to decide whether to nod or not,
what I did then couldn't make a difference. This is to say, I made sure that nothing I did or tailed to do at
that moment could count as a cause of the death.
Let me sum up the results of the last two sections. I have argued that, on the assumption that we
should respect the difference-making idea, it follows that two main attempts at counterexamples to CDM
(A/O), Assassination and Two-Assassins, fail. I first argued that Assassination isn't a counterexample to
CDM (A/O), for, while the agent's action is a cause of the outcome, the agent's omission wouldn't have
been a cause of the outcome. Then I pointed out that Assassination is a case where, intuitively, one of the
candidate causes, the agent's action, has an initial advantage over the other, the agent's omission. So the
natural reaction was to look instead for a case where the action and the omission are intuitively on a par
with respect to their causal powers and to see whether a case of that sort has a better chance of being a
counterexample to CDM (A/O). This is how we arrived at Two-Assassins. I argued, however, that, as a
result of making the action and the omission equally good candidate causes, as in Two-Assassins, it turns
out that neither is a cause, not that both are. This is to say, by depriving the candidate causes of any
initial advantage over each other, we deprive them of causal power altogether. Hence, Two-Assassins
also fails to be a counterexample to CDM (A/O).
My argument for CDM (A/O) takes, then, the following form. Possible counterexamples to CDM
(A/O) can be grouped into two main classes: the class of cases where the action and the omission aren't
22 What if I could call the whole thing off by, say, waving my hand in a particular way? Then my failure to wave
my hand in that way would have been a cause of Victim's death. Still, my flipping the switch or my failing to flip
the switch wouldn't have been a cause of the death.
intuitively on a par (with respect to their causal powers) and the class of cases where the action and the
omission are intuitively on a par. My discussion of Assassination suggests that the cases in thefirst class
fail because only one of the candidate causes is a genuine cause. In turn, my discussion of Two-Assassins
suggests that the cases in the second class fail because neither of the candidate causes is a genuine cause.
Since any alleged counterexample will fall into one of the two classes, and since the cases I have
discussed seem to be representative of their class, I conclude that there is good reason to believe that
CDM (A/O) is true. More precisely, I conclude that there is good reason to believe that CDM (A/O)
succeeds in capturing the difference-making idea in the case of actions and omissions of agents.
Finally, my focus on actions and omissions of agents was only for simplicity. In principle, it
should be possible to use the same style of argument to show that the general claim, CDM, is true. I
conclude that CDM succeeds in cashing out the difference-making idea: if causes are difference-makers,
it is in virtue of the fact that events and their absences would not have caused the same effects.
6. Implications for moral responsibility
In this final section, I draw attention to some important results that CDM has for issues in moral
responsibility.
I will suggest that CDM achieves a particularly nice fit between the concepts of causation and
moral responsibility. One way in which this emerges is as follows. Ordinarily, we regard ourselves as
morally responsible for the (foreseeable) consequences of what we do or fail to do. Intuitively, this seems
to be because, ordinarily, we regard ourselves as having a choice whether to cause those consequences. I
say "ordinarily," because there are some extraordinary circumstances where this is not the case. Notably,
if we are coerced to behave in certain ways, or if we act under the influence of some powerful drug, then
we might not have a choice whether to cause the ensuing consequences and thus we might not be
responsible for them. But these cases are extraordinary in that they are cases where we lack control of the
actions and omissions that issue in those consequences and, correspondingly, they are cases where we do
not have a choice whether to cause those consequences.
Now, according to CDM, and, in particular, according to CDM (A/O), whenever we have a
choice whether to act or fail to act in certain ways, we thereby have a choice whether to cause the ensuing
consequences. According to CDM (A/O), it simply couldn't be that, both by acting and by failing to act, I
would be causing the same consequences. Hence, CDM (A/O) suitably fits the way in which we
ordinarily think of ourselves as responsible for the consequences of our actions and omissions.
By contrast, imagine what we would have to say if we rejected CDM (A/O). If we rejected CDM
(A/O), then we would have to say that, on some occasions, both acting in certain ways and failing to act
in those ways would cause the same outcomes. Then, on those occasions, we wouldn't have a choice
whether to cause those outcomes. For, in those cases, regardless of what we did (were we to act in certain
ways or were we to fail to act in those ways), we would be causing those outcomes. Moreover, in those
cases we wouldn't have a choice whether to cause certain outcomes even if we happened to be in complete
control of the actions and omissions that caused the outcomes. But, as I have pointed out, barring
exceptions in which we lack control of our own actions and omissions, we tend to regard ourselves as
responsible for the consequences of our actions and omissions because we tend to regard ourselves as
having a choice whether to cause those consequences. Hence, rejecting CDM (A/O) would clash with the
ordinary way in which we think of ourselves as responsible for the consequences of our actions and
omissions.
Let me illustrate this point with an example, before moving on to my last remark. Take
Assassination. Suppose that I have the choice between shooting and failing to shoot. Intuitively, I then
have a choice whether to cause Victim's death. Regardless of whether Backup shoots, and regardless of
whether Backup shoots as a result of my failing to shoot or because he was going to shoot anyway, the
intuitive thought is that, if I don't shoot, I don't cause the death, and therefore I am not responsible for the
death. Now, someone might be prepared to give up this thought, upon realizing that it requires rejecting
the transitivity of causation in some contexts. What I am suggesting is that this would come at a cost: the
cost of giving up the ordinary way in which we regard ourselves as responsible for the consequences of
our actions and omissions. CDM takes the opposite route: it allows for the intransitivity of causation in
some contexts, but it accommodates the ordinary way in which we regard ourselves as responsible for the
consequences of our actions and omissions.
Finally, I will suggest that CDM is particularly helpful in accounting for the lack of moral
responsibility of agents in some cases of moral luck. Briefly, a case of moral (good) luck is a case where
an agent that behaves in a morally wrong way doesn't come out responsible for a harm thanks to the
obtaining of some circumstances that are outside of the agent's control. 23 Here is a case of moral luck
with respect to which CDM can prove particularly useful:
Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Connected: Again, Victim is trapped on the tracks. I
want Victim to die, and I have reason to believe that the main track is disconnected. So, thinking
that the train will derail if it continues on the main track, I flip the switch. As it turns out,
however, the main track has never been disconnected. As a result of my flipping the switch, the
train turns onto the side track, but then the tracks reconverge and the train hits Victim.
Intuitively, this is a case of moral luck because, even if I acted wrongly in flipping the switch, I am not
responsible for Victim's death (I might be responsible for intending to cause his death, for trying to cause
his death, etc., but not for the death itself). I thought that I would cause Victim's death by flipping the
switch, and I intended to cause the death by flipping the switch. However, even if the death did occur, it
seems that, given that the main track was connected all along, my flipping the switch did not cause the
death. Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Connected only differs from the original case, Switch, in
what I thought was the case, not in what was actually the case. Hence, if my flipping the switch does not
cause the death in Switch, it does not cause it in Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Connected
either.
Now, as I have suggested, CDM (together with the observation that the contribution that the flip
made to the death is on a par with the contribution that the failure to flip would have made to the death)
entails that the flip did not cause the death in Switch. For the same reason, CDM entails that the flip did
23 See Nagel (1979), ch. 3, and Williams (1981), ch. 2. All of Nagel's and Williams' examples are cases where the
agent isn't responsible for a harm that doesn't occur but could easily have occurred. By contrast, I will focus on
cases where the harm does occur but the agent still doesn't cause it.
not cause the death in Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Connected. As a result, CDM helps us
explain my moral luck in this case.24
It is worth noting that, on many theories of causation, it would turn out that, on the contrary, my
flipping the switch did cause the death in Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Reconnected. By way
of example, note that my flipping the switch helped to determine the causal route to the death, by
determining which track the train would take. Hence, in particular, theories of causation according to
which helping to determine the causal route to an outcome is sufficient for causing the outcome would
entail that my flipping the switch is a cause of the death. As a result, these theories would fail to account
for my moral luck in cases of this type.2
I conclude that, not only does CDM succeed in capturing the difference-making idea, but it also
yields a concept of cause that has the seemingly right kinds of connections to moral concepts, such as the
concept of moral responsibility.
7. Conclusions
In this paper I argued for a particular way of cashing out the idea that causes are difference-makers. I
argued that we should interpret this idea in the following way: a cause makes a difference to its effect in
that, if it hadn't occurred, the absence of the cause wouldn't have been a cause of the effect. I also argued
that this view of causation has important implications for moral responsibility, in particular, I argued that
it carves up a concept of cause that is particularly well suited for the work that causation does in moral
theory.
24 What principle warrants the inference "The flip wasn't a cause of the death, hence I am not morally responsible
for the death"? I answer this question in chapter 3. As we will see then, I don't think it's the principle that
responsibility requires causation, for I believe that this principle is false.
25 Typically, intentionally causing a harm (in a "non-deviant" way) is taken to be sufficient for being morally
responsible for the harm. (See, e.g., Feinberg (1970).) If this is so, any theory of causation that entails that I caused
the death will have serious trouble explaining my moral luck. For, if I caused the harm by flipping the switch, I did
it intentionally (and in a "non-deviant" way, i.e., by making the train turn onto the side track, as I intended). As a
result, if we said that my flipping the switch caused the death, it is likely that we would have to revise our views on
moral responsibility.
Chapter 2
A New Asymmetry Between Actions And Omissions
1. Introduction
Consider the following case:
Shooting: I freely decide to shoot Victim. I pull the trigger and Victim dies. Had I wavered in
my decision, an evil neuroscientist who has been secretly monitoring my brain and who can, at
any time, take control of my decision-making processes, would have sent a signal to my brain that
would have made me decide to pull the trigger anyway.
Cases of this type are famous in the literature on moral responsibility; they are called "Frankfurt-style"
cases. 26 Now, compare Shooting to this other case:
Sharks: While walking by the beach, I see a child drowning. I think I could jump into the water
and save him but I deliberately refrain from doing so. The child drowns. Unbeknownst to me,
the water is infested by sharks. Had I jumped in, the sharks would have attacked me and
prevented me from saving the child.2
There is an interesting difference between Shooting and Sharks. In Shooting, I freely made the
decision to shoot and I freely acted on that decision. Even though the neuroscientist would have
prevented me from deciding to do anything else if I had even tried to decide differently, as a matter of fact
he didn't have to intervene. Thus, I am responsible for Victim's death. By contrast, in Sharks, I am not
responsible for the child's death. Again, I freely decided to stay on the shore, and the sharks didn't have
to intervene, but, somehow, the fact that I couldn't have saved the child given that the water was infested
by sharks seems to relieve me of responsibility for the death. 28
26 After H. Frankfurt (Frankfurt (1969)). Frankfurt uses examples of this type to attack the claim that moral
responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise.
27 A case by J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (Fischer and Ravizza (1998), p. 125).
28 Throughout the paper, I will reserve the word "responsible" for morally responsible. Also, I will restrict my
attention to responsibility of agents for bad outcomes or for actions and omissions resulting in bad outcomes.
Note that the claim is only that, in Sharks, I am not responsible for the death of the child.
Presumably, I am still a bad person, given that I thought that I could save the child but, even so, I didn't
jump in. (In fact, I am probably as bad a person as someone who decides not to step in when he could
have saved the child.) 29 Also, in Sharks, I am responsible for something-presumably, for deciding to
stay on the shore, and for not trying to prevent the child's death. But I am not responsible for the child's
death. (If you are not convinced, imagine that, in addition to the sharks, there is an impenetrable wall of
rocks in the water, and a big net, and all kinds of obstacles, each one of which would nave prevented me
from saving the child. It would be very implausible to say that I am responsible for the child's death in
those circumstances.) 30
In light of the contrast between cases like Shooting and Sharks, some philosophers have
suggested that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions. For we can rephrase the
difference between Shooting and Sharks in terms of actions and omissions, as follows. In Shooting, I am
responsible for my action of killing Victim, even though, given the presence of the neuroscientist, I
couldn't have failed to kill Victim. By contrast, in Sharks, I am not responsible for my omission of
failing to save the child, for, given the presence of the sharks, I couldn't have saved the child. As a result,
it has been suggested that the following thesis holds-henceforth, the Old Asymmetry thesis:
OA: Whereas an agent can be responsible for an action even if he couldn't have done otherwise,
an agent cannot be responsible for an omission if he couldn't have done otherwise.3
29 Here I am relying on a common distinction between judgments about character and judgments about
responsibility for outcomes.
30 Someone might point out that I still chose not to save the child in those circumstances. But, can I choose to omit
to do something that I couldn't have done? Imagine that I am superstitious and think that I can save my moribund
enemy by performing a healing ritual. I refrain and my enemy dies. Did I choose to fail to save him? It seems not.
In any case, it is clear that I am not responsible for his death.
31 See, e.g., van Inwagen (1978).
In other words, OA claims that, whereas one can be responsible for acting a certain way even though one
couldn't have failed to act that way, one cannot be responsible for failing to act a certain way if one
couldn't have acted that way.
In this paper I discuss the question whether there is a moral asymmetry between actions and
omissions. I argue that there is a moral asymmetry, but it is not OA. I offer a new asymmetry thesis, and
I argue that this new asymmetry thesis succeeds in capturing the moral asymmetry between actions and
omissions that is illustrated by the contrast between Shooting and Sharks.
The plan for the paper is the following. The first part is about OA. As I said, I will reject OA;
however, it is important to reject it for the right reasons. As we will see, there are people who have
rejected OA for the wrong reasons. Those people are confused, not in their belief that OA is false, but in
the reasons they have for holding that belief. Thus, in the next section, I explain what the wrong reasons
for rejecting OA are, and why they are wrong. The discussion in that section centers around the
conditions of transmission of responsibility. In section 3, 1 look into this issue in more detail. I put forth
a principle of transmission of responsibility that has causation as an essential ingredient and that serves as
a springboard for the next two sections. In section 4, I explain how this principle supports the right
reasons for rejecting OA, and, in section 5, I explain how it gives rise to a new moral asymmetry between
actions and omissions. The new moral asymmetry rests on a causal principle according to which actions
and omissions have different causal powers. I argue for this principle in sections 6 and 7. As a result, the
picture that emerges from the paper is the following: there is a moral asymmetry between actions and
omissions, and this moral asymmetry is the consequence of a causal asymmetry between actions and
omissions and the role causation plays in the transmission of responsibility.
A note of clarification. Throughout the paper, I will be assuming that omissions can cause things
just as actions can. Thus, my proposal will not be that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and
omissions because actions can be causes while omissions can't.3 2 I will argue that, although omissions
32 In particular, my proposal will not be that omissions can never make us responsible for arvthing because they can
never cause anything (for an example of this view, see Weinryb (1980)). One reason to allow for the existence of
can be causes, the conditions under which they are causes are different from the conditions under which
actions are causes, and this results in a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions.
2. The wrong reasons for rejecting OA
Recall OA:
OA: Whereas an agent can be responsible for an action even if he couldn't have done otherwise,
an agent cannot be responsible for an omission if he couldn't have done otherwise.
Some people have rejected OA for the wrong reasons. They have reasoned as follows. 3" As we have
seen, there are Frankfurt-style action cases in which an agent is responsible for his action despite the fact
that he couldn't have done otherwise. Shooting was a case of that type: in Shooting, I am responsible for
killing Victim although, given the presence of the neuroscientist, I couldn't have done otherwise.
Similarly, the reasoning goes, there are Frankfurt-style omission cases in which an agent is responsible for
his omission even though he couldn't have done otherwise. This is an alleged example:
Frankfurt-style omission case (FSOC): I see the child drowning, I think I can save him by
jumping into the water, but I freely decide not to jump in. This time there are no sharks in the
water, but the evil neuroscientist is monitoring my brain. Had I wavered in my decision, he would
have made me decide not to jump in.
Those who have rejected OA for the wrong reasons have thought that, in FSOC, I am responsible for my
failure to save the child, even though (given the presence of the neuroscientist) I couldn't have saved him.
Thus, they have concluded that it is possible for an agent to responsible for an omission when he couldn't
have done otherwise, and so OA is false.
causation by omission is that, arguably, if we didn't allow for it, it would follow that there is also a lot less
"positive" causation than we normally think there is (for an argument for this view, see Schaffer (2000)).
33 See, e.g., Clarke (1994) and McIntyre (1994).
I will dub this objection to OA, the Frankfurt-style objection to OA, and I will dub someone who
raises this kind of objection to OA, a Frankfurt-style objector to OA. In what follows, I argue that the
Frankfurt-style objection to OA is flawed.
The first thing to notice is that the Frankfurt-style objector to OA cannot just appeal to intuition to
support his claim that I am responsible for my failure to save the child in FSOC. For the question that
arises naturally is: how can I be responsible for my failure to save the child in FSOC (as the Frankfurt-
style objector to OA claims), if (as everybody seems to agree) I am not responsible in Sharks? In both
cases, I couldn't have saved the child. Then, why am I, according to the Frankfurt-style objector,
responsible for my failure to save the child in FSOC but not in Sharks?
The Frankfurt-style objector will probably try to say the following."3 In Sharks, had I decided to
jump in, I still wouldn't have saved the child (because the sharks would have stopped me). In FSOC, by
contrast, had I decided to jump in, I would have saved the child (because there aren't sharks or any other
obstacles in the water). True, I couldn't easily have decided to jump in, since the neuroscientist was
determined not to let me make that decision. Still, had I decided to jump in, I would have saved the child.
That is, in the closest possible world where I decide to jump in-a world where the neuroscientist fails
and where there are no obstacles in the water-I save the child. In other words, in FSOC, whether the
child lived or died hinged on what I decided to do. And in all of these cases I am responsible for making
the decisions that I made (no one forced me to make them). Presumably, then, I am also responsible for
my failure to save the child in FSOC. Or so the Frankfurt-style objection to OA goes.
I take it that the thought is that, given that the child's death depended on my decision, for which I
am responsible, I am responsible for the child's death. And thus, given that I am responsible for the
child's death, I am responsible for my failure to save the child. This seems like a natural thing for the
Frankfurt-style objector to say. So I suggest the following reconstruction of the argument by the
Frankfurt-style objector:
34 Both Clarke and McIntyre suggest an argument along these lines in Clarke (1994) and McIntyre (1994).
(1) In FSOC, I am responsible for my decision not to jump in.
(2) The child's death depended on that decision.
(3) If I am responsible for X, and an outcome Y depends on X, then I am responsible for Y.
(4) Therefore, I am responsible for the child's death.
(5) If I am responsible for the child's death, then I am responsible for my failure to save the
child.
(6) Therefore, in FSOC, I am responsible for my failure to save the child.
In what follows, I am not going to discuss step (5). I think it is intuitively plausible that, in a case where I
fail to save the child, if I am responsible for the child's death, then I am also responsible for my failure to
save him.35 So I will assume that all the Frankfurt-style objector has to prove to make his case is that I am
responsible for the child's death in FSOC.
A note about (3) is in order. As it stands, (3) is not very plausible, for it makes agents come out
responsible for things that they couldn't possibly have foreseen. To make it more plausible, we should
probably add more provisos; in particular, we should probably say: "If I am responsible for X, an
outcome Y depends on X, and it was foreseeable that Y (or an outcome of Y 's type) was likely to follow X,
then I am responsible for Y." I will not be concerned with any extra provisos because it is likely that they
will be met in FSOC (and in other cases I will focus on) and thus, they will not matter for my purposes
here. For instance, in FSOC, it was foreseeable that the child's death would likely follow my decision not
to jump in. I will assume that (3) can be suitably revised in this respect, and I will leave the revisions
implicit in what follows.
I will call the argument above an argument from dependence. That argument relies heavily on a
certain concept of dependence that allegedly links my decision not to jump in to the child's death in
35 This is also the natural way to look at cases in which I am not responsible. For instance, as I pointed out in
section 1, it is natural to think that, in Sharks, I am not responsible for my failure to save the child because I am not
responsible for the child's death.
FSOC, and that purportedly transmits my responsibility from one onto the other. I will argue, however,
that there is no concept of dependence that can do that and thus, the argument fails. The discussion that
follows will center on the issue of the transmission of responsibility. This topic will play a fundamental
role in the formulation of the new asymmetry later, so it is important, not only because of its implications
for the Frankfurt-style objection to OA, but also because of its implications for the new asymmetry.
What can be the concept of dependence that the Frankfurt-style objector has in mind and that
purportedly serves to transmit responsibility to the ensuing outcome? A natural candidate is causation.
For it is natural to regard causation as a link that agents have with the world, in virtue of which they can
be responsible for what happens in it. In other words, it is natural to regard causation as the means by
which the responsibility of agents for their actions and omissions transmits to outcomes in the external
world. In the next section I will argue that, not only is this a natural picture of how the responsibility of
agents is transmitted to outcomes, but it is also the right picture. Now, however, I will argue that the
Frankfurt-style objector cannot appeal to the concept of causation in his argument from dependence
against OA.
If dependence is causation, then the relevant premises of the objector's argument about FSOC
read:
(2') My decision not to jump in caused the child's death.
(3') If I am responsible for X, and X caused an outcome Y, then I am responsible for Y (with
the usual provisos).
But (2') is false. Arguably, what caused the child's death is not my decision not to jump in, but my
failure to decide to jump in. For the child didn't die in FSOC in virtue of what I did decide to do; he died
in virtue of what I didn't decide to do.36
36 Recall that I am assuming that omissions can be causes. But, what if the Frankfurt-style objector held a much
narrower conception of causation according to which omissions cannot be causes? Or, what if he held a much more
permissive conception of causation according to which my failure to decide to jump in is a cause, but my decision
not to jump is also a cause? For reasons that will become apparent in the next section, if he said any of these two
Let me explain. First of all, it is important to distinguish between my decision not to jump in and
my failure to decide to jump in. Arguably, these things are not identical. For they have different
obtaining conditions: my failure to decide to jump in could have obtained without my decision not to
jump in obtaining. For instance, I would have failed to decide to jump in if I hadn't made any decision at
all but had kept deliberating what to do until the child drowned.37 The question arises, then: which one
of the two, my decision not to jump in or my failure to decide to jump in, has a better claim to cause the
child's death in FSOC? Presumably, the latter. For one, the child would still have died if my failure to
decide to jump in had obtained without my decision not to jump in obtaining (if I had remained
undecided). Also, the fact that I decided not to jump in seems relevant to the child's death only to the
extent that it entails that I didn't decide to jump in (if I decided not to jump in, I couldn't have decided to
jump in, and thus, I couldn't have saved the child). This suggests that what is causally relevant to the
child's death is the fact that I didn't decide to jump in, not the fact that I decided not to jump in.
Here is another example to illustrate this. Imagine that you have been poisoned and that you need
to be injected with an antidote in the next second or you will die. Although I could give you the antidote,
I give you a placebo. As a result, you die. However, you don't die as a result of my giving you the
placebo; rather, you die as a result of my not giving you the antidote. The only respect in which my
giving you the placebo seems relevant to your death is that, in the circumstances, if I gave you the
placebo, I couldn't have given you the antidote. Thus, it seems that it is my not giving you the antidote,
not my giving you the placebo, that caused your death. Similarly, in FSOC, it is my not deciding to jump
in, not my deciding not to jump in, that caused the child's death.
things, then it would follow that, contrary to what we are assuming, causation isn't appropriate to transmit
responsibility, and thus a different premise of the argument, (3'), would fail.
37 Notice that I am rejecting the view that some philosophers have taken, according to which omissions are a
subclass of actions. I do not find this view compelling. One serious problem with it is that sometimes, given an
omission, there aren't any actions that can plausibly be identified with it, or, alternatively, there isn't a single action
that can plausibly be identified with it. For discussion, see Weinryb (1980).
I have argued that premise (2') of the Frankfurt-style argument against OA fails: the child's
death wasn't caused by my decision not to jump in, but by my failure to decide to jump in. Now, in light
of this objection, the Frankfurt-style objector might think of substituting "my failure to decide to save the
child" for "my decision not to save the child" in the relevant premises of the argument, thus:
(1') In FSOC, I am responsible for my failure to decide to jump in.
(2") My failure to decide to jump in caused the child's death.
As I have argued, (2") is probably true. But now the problem is that (1') is, at the very least,
controversial. What is clear about FSOC is that I am responsible for what I decided (a mental action of
mine); it is not equally clear that I am responsible for what I failed to decide (a mental omission of mine).
Let me explain. Premise (1) of the original Frankfurt-style argument was uncontroversial because
my decision not to jump in is an action and because, as Frankfurt-style action cases show, I can be
responsible for actions that I couldn't have avoided when I make them freely (when no one forces me to
make them). But the revised premise, (1'), is not supported by a similar reasoning. True, no one forced
me to fail to decide to jump in either. But this isn't enough to show that I am responsible for failing to
decide to jump in. For, as we have seen, omission cases behave differently from action cases. In Sharks,
for instance, no one forced me to fail to save the child, but I am still not responsible for failing to save the
child.38 If the Frankfurt-style objector to OA wants to insist that, in FSOC, I am responsible for failing to
decide to jump in (not just for deciding not to jump in), then his argument becomes question-begging.
For there is no more reason to believe that I am responsible for failing to decide to jump in (his premise)
than there is to believe that I am responsible for failing to save the child (his conclusion), or, at least, the
Frankfurt-style objector hasn't given us any such reason. After all, failing to decide to jump in and failing
to save the child are both omissions, and, given the presence of the neuroscientist in the background, I
could have avoided neither of them.
38 I made a similar point in n. 30 above.
In this section I argued that the Frankfurt-style objection to OA fails, on the assumption that
causation is the type of dependence that transmits the responsibility of agents for their actions and
omissions to outcomes in the world. In the next section, I will argue that this assumption is very likely to
be true. This will close my discussion of the Frankfurt-style objection to OA, and it will also get us a step
closer to the new asymmetry.
3. The role of causation in the transmission of responsibility
If not causation, then what other type of dependence could transmit responsibility to outcomes? Maybe
counterfactual dependence could? In what follows, I argue that counterfactual dependence isn't a
suitable candidate. Counterfactual dependence will be my specific target, but, as we will see, my
argument is likely to extend to other possible candidates as well. I will conclude that causation is the
most suitable candidate for transmitting responsibility to outcomes.
Counterfactual dependence is defined in the following way:
Y counterfactually depends on X just in case, had X not occurred, Y would not have occurred.
The principle according to which counterfactual dependence transmits responsibility to outcomes is the
following:
TR (Counterfactual): If I am responsible for X, and an outcome Y counterfactually depends on
X, then I am responsible for Y (with the usual provisos).
Notice that, if TR (Counterfactual) were true, it could help the Frankfurt-style objector in his
argument against OA. For it is possible to fill in the details of FSOC so that the child's death
counterfactually depended on my decision not to jump in. For instance, we could imagine that I am very
decisive type of person. So, had I not decided not to jump in, I would have decided to jump in and thus, I
would have saved the child. That is, in the closest possible world where I don't decide not to jump in (a
world where the neuroscientist failed, I am a decisive person, and there are no obstacles in the water), the
child lives. Hence, in FSOC thus conceived, the child's death counterfactually depends on my decision
not to jump in. And I am responsible for this decision. Hence, if TR (Counterfactual) were true, it would
follow that I am responsible for the child's death, and then, for my failure to save the child, in FSOC. So
FSOC would be a counterexample to OA.
But TR (Counterfactual) isn't true, as shown by the following case. Imagine that a runaway train
is going along the main track (track A) when it approaches a switch. I am by the switch and I see that, if
the train continues on track A, it will run over a person, Victim, who is standing further down the track.
Although switching to B wouldn't help, switching to C would, as depicted by the following picture:
Imagine that I have an irresistible urge for flipping switches and that I don't care whether Victim lives or
dies. I think about where to flip the switch, and I decide to switch it to B. Victim dies. Unbeknownst to
me, a neuroscientist has been monitoring my brain and is in control of my bodily movements. Had I
decided to switch the train to C, he would have forced my finger into the B-position. So I couldn't have
saved Victim.
In this case, given that I freely decided to flip the switch to B, I am responsible for flipping the
switch to B (although I couldn't have done otherwise). But I am not likewise responsible for Victim's
death. After all, the case has the same structure as Sharks in this respect: I could have decided to switch
the train to C, but I couldn't have saved Victim, for the neuroscientist would have stopped me.
(Compare: in Sharks, I could have decided to jump in, but I couldn't have saved the child, for the sharks
ch
would have stopped me.)39 But Victim's death counterfactually depends on my flipping the switch to B:
had I not flipped it to B, I would have flipped it to C and Victim would have lived. For, in the closest
possible world where I don't flip the switch to B (a world where the neuroscientist fails and where I still
have an urge for flipping switches) I flip it to C and Victim lives. Thus, I am responsible for switching
the train to B, I am not responsible for Victim's death, but Victim's death counterfactually depends on my
switching the train to B. In other words, TR (Counterfactual) is false. 4
At the same time, this case serves to illustrate the fact that there can be counterfactual dependence
without causation.41 In this case, Victim's death counterfactually depended on my switching the train to
B but wasn't caused by it. If anything, Victim's death was caused by my failure to switch the train to C,
the safe track. For the fact that I switched the train to the unsafe track is relevant to Victim's death only
to the extent that it entails the fact that I didn't switch the train to the safe track. This suggests that the
cause of Victim's death was my failure to switch the train to C, not my switching it to B instead.4 2
As a result, what emerges from the example is that, when causation is absent, responsibility does
not transmit to the ensuing outcome, even if there is counterfactual dependence. Thus, even if I was
responsible for switching the train to B, my responsibility does not transmit to Victim's death, because
my switching the train to B didn't cause Victim's death. The example also supports the idea that, when
there is causation, responsibility does transmit to the outcome (with the usual provisos). Thus, in the
example, had I been responsible for failing to switch the train to C, then I would also have been
39 Given that everybody agrees about Sharks, everybody should agree about this case. In particular, the Frankfurt-
style objector to OA should. Recall that he wants to draw a difference between FSOC and Sharks. He wants to say
that, if I couldn't have made the morally right decision (as in FSOC), then I am responsible for failing to save the
child; by contrast, if I cou I have made the morally right decision but I would have been stopped afterwards (as in
Sharks), then I am not. The train case is analogous to Sharks, not to FSOC: by assumption, the neuroscientist
would have intervened after I made the decision to switch to C, by forcing me to switch to B.
40 Notice that it was foreseeable that my flippir. ...- switch to B would be followed by Victim's death. Hence, the
failure of transmission of responsibility cannot be blamed on the usual epistemic provisos, which are met in this
case.
41 Pace some theories of causation that regard counterfactual dependence as sufficient for causation. See, e.g.,
Lewis (1986a).
42 Notice the parallel with my discussion of FSOC in the preceding section.
responsible for Victim's death, given that my failing to switch to C caused Victim's death. In this case,
however, I was not responsible for failing to switch the train to C, because I couldn't have switched it to
C (again, the case is like Sharks in this respect: I could have decided to switch the train to C, but I
couldn't have acted on that decision because the neuroscientist would have stopped me). Thus, I am not
responsible for Victim's death.43
I have argued that the most plausible candidate for transmitting responsibility to outcomes is
causation. I don't intend this to be a knockdown argument against any other possible candidate, but I
think it does make a good prima facie case for my view. In a nutshell, the view that I have defended is
the following:
TR (Causal): An agent's responsibility for X transmits to an outcome Y iff X causes Y (and the
usual provisos obtain). 44
TR (Causal) says that causation is necessary for the transmission of responsibility to outcomes (other
notions of dependence by themselves won't do), and it says that it is also sufficient, with the usual
provisos.
In what follows, TR (Causal) will play a double role: it will generate the right reasons for
rejecting OA, and it will support the new moral asymmetry between actions and omissions. I take these
up in turn in the next two sections.
43 Again, notice the parallel with my discussion of FSOC. In FSOC, had I been responsible for failing to decide to
jump in, I would also have been responsible for the child's death, because my failing to decide to jump in caused my
the child's death. However, as I pointed out in the last section, it is not clear that I was responsible for failing to
decide to jump in (what is clear is that I was responsible for deciding not to jump in).
44 J. Feinberg endorses a view of this type in Feinberg (1970).
4. The right reasons for rejecting OA
As we have seen, FSOC is not a counterexample to OA, or, at least, the Frankfurt-style objector hasn't
given us good reason to believe that it is. I submit that, by contrast, the following case is a
counterexample:
Planted Sharks: This time I am responsible for the sharks being in the water: yesterday I
negligently released the sharks in the area--I had no good reason to release the sharks, and I had
good reason not to, but I still did. Today I see that the child is drowning but I do not attempt a
rescue because it would be fruitless.45
I will argue that Planted Sharks is a counterexample to OA because, although I couldn't have saved the
child today, I am responsible for failing to save him today. Thus, it is possible to be responsible for an
omission when one couldn't have done otherwise, and so OA is false.
The reason that I couldn't have saved the child in Planted Sharks is, again, that the sharks are in
the water.46 And the reason that I am responsible for my failure to save the child is that I am responsible
for planting the sharks, which was one of the causes of the child's death. This is to say, unlike what was
the case with FSOC, an argument from dependence succeeds in showing that I am responsible for failing
to save the child in Planted Sharks. The argument appeals to the right kind of dependence, namely,
causation, and it goes as follows:
(7) In Planted Sharks, I am responsible for planting the sharks yesterday.
(8) My planting the sharks yesterday caused the child's death today.
(9) TR (Causal): An agent's responsibility for X transmits to an outcome Y iff X causes Y
(and the usual provisos obtain).
(10) Therefore, I am responsible for the child's death today.
45 See also Clarke's drunk driver example in Clarke (1994).
46 Couldn't I have saved him by not planting the sharks yesterday? To dissipate any worries of this sort, imagine
that someone else would have planted the sharks had I not done so myself. Then I couldn't have saved the child, not
even by not planting the sharks. Still, given that I planted the sharks, I am responsible for failing to save the child
today.
(11) If I am responsible for the child's death, then I am responsible for my failure to save the
child.
(12) Therefore, in Planted Sharks, I am responsible for my failure to save the child today.
This argument seems to go through. I am clearly responsible for planting the sharks, and my
planting the sharks is clearly a cause of the child's death. Thus, it follows by TR (Causal) that I am
responsible for the child's death. And, if I am responsible for the child's death, I am presumably also
responsible for my failure to save the child.47
In this section, I presented the right reasons for rejecting OA. I argued that Planted Sharks is a
counterexample to OA, and I used TR (Causal) to support this claim. In the next section, I will argue that
a different asymmetry thesis is unscathed by Planted Sharks. Again, this new asymmetry thesis will be
supported, at least in part, by TR (Causal).
5. The new moral asymmetry
In the last section I pointed out that, in Planted Sharks, the child's death today was caused by my planting
the sharks in the water yesterday. Presumably, however, it wasn't also caused by my failure to jump into
the water today. After all, jumping in today wouldn't have helped. Otherwise put: in Planted Sharks, I
brought about the child's death today by bringing about yesterday that I could not prevent that death
today, not by not trying to prevent a death today that I couldn't have prevented. In Planted Sharks, then,
the fact that the child's death would have occurred anyway deprives my omission to jump in of its causal
powers with respect to the death.
47 Two words of clarification. First, notice that the usual provisos of TR (Causal) are met in Planted Sharks. By
assumption, I was guilty of negligence in planting the sharks. So, in particular, it was foreseeable that my planting
the sharks was likely to be followed by a harm of the sort that ensued. Second, is step (11I) warranted in this case? I
think it is. Start by imagining that today there are other people around the child that cannot save him as a result of
my having planted the sharks yesterday. Clearly, I would be responsible for these other people's failures to save the
child in that case. Similarly, it seems to me that, if I am the only person standing close to the child today and if I
negligently released the sharks yesterday, then I am responsible for my own failure to save the child today.
Now, this suggests that there might be a new asymmetry between actions and omissions lurking
in the background. For actions don't generally behave in this way. Take my action of planting the
sharks, for instance. Imagine that, unbeknownst to me, had I not planted the sharks, someone else would
have (and there's nothing that I could have done to prevent it). Still, given that I planted the sharks, I
caused the child's death. In other words, although the child's death would still have occurred had I not
planted the sharks, my planting the sharks caused it. By contrast, as I have pointed out, given that the
child's death would still have occurred even if I had jumped in, my omission to jump in didn't cause it.
The asymmetry between actions and omissions that seems to be lurking in the background is a
causal asymmetry: it is an asymmetry in the conditions under which actions and omissions can be
causes. It is expressed by the following claim, the New Asymmetry (Causal) claim:
NA (Causal): An action can cause an outcome even if the outcome would still have occurred in
the absence of the action. By contrast, an omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome
would still have occurred in the absence of the omission.
According to NA (Causal), an agent can cause an outcome by acting a certain way even it the outcome
would still have occurred had he not acted by way, but an agent cannot cause an outcome by failing to act
a certain way if the outcome would still have occurred had he acted that way.
Of course, a few examples aren't enough to support a general principle like NA (Causal), and, in
particular, the general claim that it makes about omissions. I will argue for NA (Causal) in the next
section. Now, however, I will show that, on the assumption that NA (Causal) is true, a new moral
asymmetry emerges between actions and omissions. This new moral asymmetry is based on NA (Causal)
and TR (Causal), the principle of transmission of responsibility that I defended in section 3.
Recall TR (Causal):
TR (Causal): An agent's responsibility for X transmits to an outcome Y iff X causes Y (and the
usual provisos obtain).
From TR (Causal) and NA (Causal), this claim follows:
48
NA: An agent's responsibility for an action can transmit to an outcome even if the outcome
would have occurred anyway in the absence of the action. However, an agent's responsibility for
an omission cannot transmit to an outcome if the outcome would have occurred anyway in the
absence of the omission.
NA is the New Asymmetry claim. It is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions: an asymmetry
in the conditions under which one can be responsible for outcomes by action and by omission (in virtue of
having acted a certain way and in virtue of having failed to act a certain way). Alternatively put, it is an
asymmetry in the conditions under which responsibility for actions and omissions transmits to
outcomes. 48
Take the example of Sharks, for instance. In Sharks, I am responsible for an omission of mine,
failing to jump into the water (since, as far as I knew, I could have saved the child by jumping in). Now,
given the presence of the sharks, the child's death would still have occurred had I jumped in. Thus NA
entails that my responsibility for failing to jump in doesn't carry over to the child's death. This is the
right result.49 Contrast this with Planted Sharks. In Planted Sharks, too, the child's death would still have
occurred had I jumped in. However, in contrast with Sharks, in Planted Sharks I am responsible for an
action that I performed yesterday-namely, planting the sharks-in virtue of which I cannot save the
child today. Thus, NA allows us to say that I am responsible for the child's death because I am
48 It is important to distinguish NA from a different asymmetry that some people have defended, according to which
there is a moral difference between causing a death by action and causing it by omission, or between killing
someone and letting someone die. Some people have suggested that, other things being equal, killing is worse than
letting die. But the discussion of whether this is true centers around cases where the outcome wouldn't have
occurred anyway, in particular, it is generally assumed that one lets someone die by failing to act only if, by acting,
one would have saved the person. Thus, the question whether killing is worse than letting die is not likely to shed
any light on the question whether NA is true. For discussion of the killing and letting die distinction, see, e.g.,
Bennett (1994) and Foot (1994).
49 What if, at the same time that I failed to jump into the water, someone else failed to put the sharks in a cage?
(Imagine that it was this other person's job to do so.) Aren't we then jointly responsible for the child's death? I
think so, but I think that our individual failures still don't cause the death. Rather, our joint failure causes the death
(see chapter 3).
responsible for planting the sharks.50 Notice that NA would allow us to say this even if it turned out that,
had I not planted the sharks yesterday, someone else would have, and thus, even if it turned out that, had I
not planted the sharks yesterday, the child's death would still have occurred today. Again, this is the right
result.5'
Here are another two scenarios that serve to illustrate the content of NA. In the first scenario,
"Drunken Doctor," a tumor is found in a patient's brain, and the surgeon who is to operate on the patient
gets drunk before the operation. During the operation, he fails to perform a cut that would have served to
remove the tumor, and the patient dies as a result. Had the doctor not been drunk, however, he would
have recognized the need for the cut, he would have made the cut and removed the tumor, and the patient
would have lived. Clearly, the doctor is responsible for the death of his patient in Drunken Doctor. In the
second scenario, "Lucky Doctor," a tumor is found in a patient's brain, and the doctor negligently fails to
make the cut that doctors normally make in cases of that sort to try to remove the tumor. The patient dies
from the tumor. However (unbeknownst to the doctor at the time of the operation), the tumor was too
deep into the patient's brain and couldn't have been removed, so, as it turns out, making the cut wouldn't
have helped (imagine that there is no way to remove tumors that deep without killing the patient). In this
case, it seems that, although the doctor is responsible for not making the cut (any good surgeon would
have made the cut in his place), he is not similarly responsible for the patient's death. In this respect, the
doctor is morally lucky: as it turned out, the patient wouldn't have lived if he had made the cut, so he is
not responsible for the death by virtue of not making the cut. Thus, Drunken Doctor and Lucky Doctor
50 That is, I am responsible for the child's death, but the responsibility is inherited from my planting the sharks, not
from my failing to jump in. It is inherited from the former and not from the latter because the former, not the latter,
is a cause of the death.
s1 NA only allows us to say this, instead of forcing us to say this, because-unlike TR (Causal)-it doesn't provide
sufficient conditions for the transmission of responsibility, but it is only concerned with a necessary condition for
the transmission of responsibility that exists in the case of omissions but not in the case of actions.
differ with respect to the doctor's responsibility for the patient's death: while the drunken doctor is
responsible for the death, the lucky doctor is not.52
What would NA say about these cases? About Lucky Doctor, NA would say that, even if the
doctor is responsible for an omission of his, his not making the cut, the responsibility does not carry over
to the patient's death. For the death would still have occurred if he had made the cut. This is the right
result. Now consider Drunken Doctor. In Drunken Doctor, had the doctor made the cut, the patient
wouldn't have died. Hence NA does not entail that the doctor's responsibility for his failure to make the
cut doesn't carry over to the death. NA only says that an agent's responsibility for his omission does not
carry over to an outcome when the outcome would still have occurred in the absence of the agent's
omission. In cases like Drunken Doctor, however, the outcome would not have occurred in the absence
of the agent' s omission. Therefore, NA is consistent with the claim that the drunken doctor is responsible
for the patient's death in virtue of his not making the cut. Again, this is the right result.53
In this section I motivated NA (Causal) by appeal to examples, and I explained how the new
moral asymmetry claim, NA, follows from NA (Causal) and TR (Causal). I already argued for TR
(Causal) in section 3. Thus, in order to complete my argument for NA, I must argue for NA (Causal). I
turn to this in the next section.
6. The causal asymmetry
Recall NA (Causal):
NA (Causal): An action can cause an outcome even if the outcome would still have occurred in
the absence of the action. By contrast, an omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome
would still have occurred in the absence of the omission.
52 1 emphasize that we would probably still want to say that both doctors are bad doctors, maybe even equally bad
doctors. I remind the reader that I am relying on the distinction between judgments about character and judgments
about responsibility for outcomes (see n. 29).
53 Again, NA is only consistent with this claim instead of entailing it because it doesn't provide sufficient
conditions for the transmission of responsibility (see n. 51).
Why should we believe that there is such a difference between the causal powers of actions and
omissions? In what follows, I offer a reason to believe this.
Start by contrasting the following two types of situations, which I will call switches and non-
switches. An example of a switch is the following case:
Redirecting the Train: A train is hurtling down a track, where a person, Victim, is standing (up
ahead). There is a spur of track on the right, and a switch. I flip the switch and as a result the
train turns; however, the two tracks reconverge before the spot where Victim is standing. Victim
gets killed by the train.
By contrast, here is an example of a non-switch:
Pulling the Trigger. Assassin is about to shoot Victim. I don't realize this, and since I want
Victim to die too, I pull the trigger of my own, gun. Victim dies as a result.
Here is yet another non-switch:
Removing the Shield: Assassin is about to shoot Victim. There is a bulletproof shield that would
have stopped the bullet before it reached Victim. I remove the shield. Assassin shoots and
Victim dies as a result. Had I not removed the shield, however, Backup would have, and Victim
would still have died.
Fill in the details of the cases so that in none of these cases there is something that I could have done to
save Victim: Victim would still have died, had I done anything else. (Imagine, in the first case, that I
cannot stop the train and that there are no other tracks to divert the train to; in the second case, that I
cannot stop Assassin; and, in the third case, that I cannot stop either Assassin or Backup.) If so, in all of
these cases, switches and non-switches, what I do does not affect the outcome-Victim would still have
died, had I done anything else-but merely helps to determine the route by which the outcome occurs.
However, there is an important difference between switches and non-switches. Intuitively, I
don't cause the death in a switch like Redirecting the Train, but I do cause the death in a non-switch like
Pulling the Trigger or Removing the Shield. Intuitively, when one merely redirects a train that was
already going to hit and kill a person, one doesn't thereby cause the person's death; by contrast, when one
shoots the bullet that kills a person, or when one removes an obstacle to an ongoing bullet, one does cause
the person's death, even if the death would still have occurred had one not done those things.54
Now, what is the source of this causal difference between the two types of case? Intuitively, it
seems to be the following. Even though in both types of case the outcome would still have occurred had I
failed to act the way I did, in a non-switch the agent creates a new threat or promotes a preexisting threat.
Thus, in Pulling the Trigger, the death would have occurred even if I hadn't shot, because Assassin would
have shot, but by pulling the trigger I created a new threat that went to completion. Hence, I caused his
death. And, in Removing the Shield, the death would have occurred even if I hadn't removed the shield,
because Backup would have removed it, but by removing the shield I promoted the old threat to Victim: I
removed an obstacle to it, and the threat then went to completion. Hence, I caused Victim's death. By
contrast, in a switch, there is a preexisting threat and the agent does not promote it or create a new one.
At most, the agent diverts the preexisting threat onto a slightly different path, as in Redirecting the Train.
Hence, the agent does not cause the outcome by acting the way he does.
I will assume that this account of the causal difference between switches and non-switches is
intuitive enough and can be put to work successfully. A more complete explanation of the difference
should probably contain an account of the concepts of a threat, creation of a threat, and promotion of a
threat. Unfortunately, I cannot do this here. Thus, I have to rely on intuition to ground my claims about
the difference between switches and non-switches. But it does seem intuitive enough, first, that there is a
causal difference between switches and non-switches and, second, that the causal difference is grounded
in a difference between creating a new threat or promoting an old threat, on the one hand, and neither
creating a new threat nor promoting an old threat, but at most redirecting an old threat, on the other.
Now, assuming this story about the causal difference between switches and non-switches, I
suggest that a similar story can be told in support of NA (Causal). NA (Causal) says that the fact that an
5 I stress that this is only an appeal to intuition. Some theories of causation don't yield the intuitive verdict about
switches. For attempts at capturing our causal intuition about switches, see Rowe (1989) and Yablo (2002). In
chapter 1, I argued that embracing the "difference-making idea" about causation (the idea that causes make a
difference to their effects) requires respecting our causal intuitions about switches.
outcome was going to happen anyway deprives an agent's omission of its causal powers towards the
outcome, while it doesn't necessarily deprive an agent's action of its causal powers towards the outcome.
My suggestion is that this is so because every omission case where the outcome would have occurred
anyway is a switch, but some action cases where the outcome would have occurred anyway are non-
switches. We have already seen that some action cases where the outcome would have occurred anyway
are non-switches (Pulling the Trigger and Removing the Shield are cases of this type). In order to see that
NA (Causal) is true, then, it remains to be shown that any omission case where the outcome would have
occurred anyway is a switch. This is what I do in what follows.
Consider Sharks again. Given the presence of the sharks in the water, I couldn't have prevented
the death of the child by jumping in. Also, intuitively, by refraining from jumping in, I didn't create a
new threat or promote the preexisting threat in any way, simply because I didn't do anything: I just let
the ongoing process run its preset course. There was an existing process leading to the death, which was
developing in a certain way, and, by failing to act, I let it keep developing that way. Intuitively, any time
one doesn't interfere with a process, one doesn't promote it (or create a new one): one just lets it unfold.
Thus, it seems that omissions don't promote existing threats or create new threats; at most, they let
existing threats develop in certain ways. If so, any omission case where the outcome would have
occurred anyway is a switch, in the way I have defined switches.
A word of clarification: I stress that I am not suggesting that, given that omissions don't promote
existing threats or create new threats, they never cause anything. Many times, letting a process develop in
a certain way is sufficient for causing an outcome. For instance, if a mother doesn't feed her baby when
she could easily have fed him, and the baby starves to death, then the mother lets the process of starvation
develop but she clearly causes the baby's death. Rather, what I am suggesting is that, when the outcome
would have occurred anyway, an omission doesn't cause the outcome given that, first, the outcome would
have occurred anyway and, second, omissions don't promote or create threats. This is what happens in
Redirecting the Train, an ordinary switch: in Redirecting the Train, I don't cause Victim's death by
flipping the switch because, first, the death would still have occurred if I hadn't flipped the switch, and,
second, by flipping the switch I don't promote the preexisting threat or create a new one.
Also, it is important to realize that, although NA (Causal) says that, when an outcome would still
have occurred in the absence of an omission, that omission isn't a cause of the outcome, this is consistent
with its being the case that something else that the agent did or failed to do caused the outcome. For
instance, in Planted Sharks, my failure to jump in isn't a cause of the child's death, because the death
would still have occurred if I had jumped in, but my planting the sharks, an action of mine, is a cause. Or
imagine that I am an absentminded lifeguard. The child is drowning, and there are no sharks. Still, I
wouldn't have saved the child by jumping in because, if I had jumped in, I would have forgotten the life
preserver and thus I wouldn't have been able to save the child. According to NA (Causal), my failure to
jump in isn't a cause of the child's death, because the death would still have occurred if I had jumped in.
However, arguably, my failure to jump in with the life preserver, a different omission of mine, is a cause.
(Presumably, my failure to jump in and my failure to jump in with the life preserver are different failures,
since they obtain under different circumstances, and, of the two, the second has a better claim to being a
cause.)
Now, all the cases that I discussed have a common structure. Their structure is the following. An
agent fails to act in a certain way and an outcome occurs. Had the agent acted in the relevant way, the
outcome would still have occurred because the agent's intervention wouldn't have sufficed to stop the
ongoing threat, which would have still gone to completion. For instance, in Sharks, the drowning process
is on its way, and I wouldn't have stopped it by jumping into the water: it would have gone to completion
anyway. Call any case of this type an easy case. I think I have successfully argued that, in the easy cases,
the agent's omission doesn't cause the outcome. However, there are cases of a different type, with a
different underlying structure, which are more likely to make trouble for NA (Causal). I turn to these
cases in the next section.
7. The hard cases and the issue of transitivity
A hard case is a case with the following structure. An agent fails to act in a certain way and an outcome
occurs. Had the agent acted in the relevant way, the outcome would still have occurred; however, it
would have occurred as a result of a different threat from the one that actually led to the outcome (call the
threat that actually led to the outcome "the actual threat"). That is, the agent could have stopped the
actual threat, but he still couldn't have prevented the outcome. He couldn't have prevented the outcome
because there was a backup threat: had he stopped the actual threat, then the backup threat would have
issued in the outcome just the same. Here is an example:
Evil Bystander: Assassin is about to shoot Victim. I could stop him, but, since I want Victim
dead too, I let him shoot. Victim dies. Unbeknownst to me, however, Backup is waiting in
reserve. Had I stopped Assassin, then Backup would have shot, and Victim would still have died
(imagine that I couldn't have stopped Backup, and imagine, also, that the details of the death
would have been very similar, so it would have been the same death).
In Evil Bystander, I could have stopped the actual threat, but I still couldn't have prevented the outcome
from happening because, had I acted, the backup threat would have issued in the outcome just the same.
Why is Evil Bystander a hard case for NA (Causal)? Because, in this case, one might be tempted
to say the following. Given that I could have stopped the process that actually ended in Victim's death
and I didn't, then, by failing to stop it, I contributed to the death. So my failure to stop Assassin was one
of the causes of the death, although I couldn't have prevented the death. Hence, NA (Causal) is false: an
omission can cause something that would have occurred anyway. In other words, the objection that a
hard case like Evil Bystander can give rise to is that, contrary to what I have suggested, merely letting a
threat unfold can be enough to cause an outcome, even if the outcome would have occurred anyway. In
particular, the objection is that letting the actual threat unfold, when one could have stopped it, is enough
to cause an outcome, even if the outcome would have occurred anyway via a backup threat. 55
55 J.J. Thomson believes that omissions can cause outcomes that would have occurred anyway in cases of this sort
(Thomson (2003), p. 81). Her example is this. A prisoner is in a cell. Sally is supposed to give him water and Bert
is supposed to give him bread, but neither complies. The prisoner dies from dehydration. Hence, Thomson claims,
Sally's failure to give him water caused his death although the death would still have occurred (from starvation) if
In what follows, I argue that whether we think that we should revise NA (Causal) in light of hard
cases like Evil Bystander essentially depends on our take on the transitivity of causation: we should
revise it if we think that causation is transitive, but not so if we think that it is not transitive, or if we are
unsure. I will briefly explain the main reasons for being skeptical about transitivity. However, I will not
try to settle the issue of transitivity here, because it is an issue that deserves a much more extensive
treatment than I can offer in this paper. As a result, I will leave it open whether NA (Causal) is in need of
refinement, and I will briefly indicate how NA (Causal) could be revised in light of the hard cases, if one
deemed it necessary.
Let us start by asking: why should we believe that, if one lets the actual threat unfold when one
could have stopped it, one causes the outcome? The main motivation for believing this is the following.
Since one could have stopped the actual threat but doesn't, one's failure to act is a cause of the actual
threat's unfolding, 56 and the actual threat's unfolding is a cause of the outcome; hence, by transitivity,
one's failure to act is a cause of the outcome. In Evil Bystander, my failure to stop Assassin was a cause
of his shooting, and Assassin's shooting was a cause of Victim's death; hence, by transitivity, my failure
to stop Assassin was a cause of Victim's death. In other words, the thought that, in the hard cases, the
agent's omission causes the outcome because it lets the actual threat go to completion, is fueled by the
thought that causation is transitive, which is expressed by the following principle:
Transitivity: If X causes Y, and Y causes Z, then X causes Z.
she had given him water. I prefer to focus on Evil Bystander for the following reasons. First, a person can survive a
long time without food but not long without water. Hence, the death by starvation might not have been the same
death, because it would have occurred at a much later time. Second, the death by starvation might not have been the
same death because many of the details of the death would have been different. Third, even if the death by
starvation would have been the same death, the suffering preceding the death would have been very different (since
thirst is a lot more painful than hunger). Hence, there is the danger that our intuitions about the causes of the death
get mixed up with our intuitions about the causes of the suffering preceding the death. Evil Bystander is specifically
designed to sidestep these problems.
56 This is the difference from the easy cases. In an easy case, I don't cause the actual threat's unfolding, since I
couldn't have stopped the actual threat.
In the contemporary literature on causation, there is considerable debate over whether Transitivity
is true. Some people believe that Transitivity is a general truth about causation, but other people think
that it has counterexamples.57 As I said, I will not try to settle this issue here; however, I will briefly
explain what some of the problems with endorsing Transitivity are.
One of the problems with Transitivity is illustrated by Evil Bystander itself. As I have pointed
out, Transitivity supports the claim that my failure to stop Assassin causes Victim's death in Evil
Bystander: if Transitivity is true, then my failure to stop Assassin causes Victim's death because it causes
Assassin's shooting, which causes Victim's death. However, by the same token, Transitivity supports the
claim that, had i stopped Assassin, then my stopping Assassin would have caused Victim's death. For,
had I stopped Assassin, then my stopping Assassin would have caused Backup to shoot, which would
have caused Victim's death (recall that Backup is determined to shoot if Assassin doesn't). Hence, if
Transitivity were true, it would follow that my stopping Assassin would have caused Victim's death too.
In other words, I would have also caused the death if I had done the right thing. And this is
counterintuitive.
Transitivity also yields puzzling results about Sharks. As we have seen, my failure to jump into
the water in Sharks is not a cause of the child's death. But imagine that I had jumped in. Had I jumped
in, then my jumping in would have caused the sharks to attack me, and the shark attack would have in
turn caused the child's death 58. Hence, if Transitivity were true, it would follow that my jumping into the
water in Sharks would have caused the child's death. In other words, I don't cause the child's death by
refraining from jumping in, but I would have caused his death by jumping in. This is an extremely
counterintuitive result.
57 For discussion of Transitivity, see, e.g., Hall (2000), Hitchcock (2001) and Paul (2000). In chapter 1, I argued
that the difference-making idea enters in conflict with Transitivity, and that rejecting Transitivity in favor of the
difference-making idea has the advantage that we can more easily account for our attributions of moral
responsibility to agents.
58 Just as, if I attack someone that is about to rescue the child, and t0en the child dies, I am a cause of the child's
death.
I have explained how our take on the hard cases seems to heavily depend on our take on
Transitivity, and I have explained what some of the main problems with Transitivity are. Now, could it
be argued that the hard cases pose a problem for NA (Causal) regardless of what our take on Transitivity
is? In particular, could it be argued that intuition alone shows that the hard cases are counterexamples to
NA (Causal)?
I will argue that intuition alone is not enough to show this, because our intuitions about the hard
cases are morally tainted. Take Evil Bystander. The way I set up the case, Evil Bystander is a case where
my intentions are morally despicable. For I failed to stop Assassin when I thought that I could have
prevented Victim's death by stopping him (since I was unaware of Backup's intentions). No wonder,
then, that we feel tempted to say that I caused Victim's death. However, imagine that the details of the
case are different. Imagine, for instance, that I am a good person and that I don't want for Victim to die.
However, I still fail to stop Assassin. I fail to stop him because I see that Backup is waiting in reserve
and I know that he will shoot if Assassin doesn't. Imagine, moreover, that I have good reason to let
Assassin shoot instead of Backup: imagine, for instance, that I know that Backup is a very good shooter
and I think that Victim will end up suffering more if I stop Assassin (say, because his hopes will be high
again for a moment and then there will come the tragic realization that he will die anyway). In such
circumstances, I find it a lot less plausible to say that I cause Victim's death by not stopping Assassin.
After all, all I did was to do nothing, when there was nothing that I could have done to help.59
If so, this should be enough to cast doubt on our intuitions about Evil Bystander itself, where my
intentions were bad. For none of the details of the sort I mentioned should be relevant to whether I
caused Victim's death by failing to stop Assassin, since they only have to do with my intentions and
beliefs (with what I thought was the case and with what I intended to be the case, but not with what was
actually the case). Such details help to determine whether or not my intentions were morally good in
59 I don't mean to suggest that it is impossible to say that I cause the death in this case (clearly, it would be possible
to say that I cause the death but I am still not morally responsible for it). All I mean to suggest is that our intuitions
about this case are different from those about Evil Bystander.
failing to stop Assassin, but not whether I caused Victim's death by failing to stop Assassin. This
suggests that our intuitions about these cases are probably tainted by our moral judgments about the cases.
Hence, we should probably not trust those intuitions.
I argued that, apart from Transitivity, there doesn't seem to be any compelling reason to believe
that the hard cases undermine NA (Causal). Hence, unless we are moved by Transitivity, we shouldn't
revise NA (Causal) in light of the hard cases. I also explained what some of the problems with
Transitivity are. However, for all I have said, there might be powerful reasons to hold Transitivity despite
some of its counterintuitive consequences. And, if so, NA (Causal) would be in need of refinement. In
light of this, I will end my discussion of the causal asymmetry with a sketch of how NA (Causal) could be
revised, if it were necessary to revise it.
If one were to revise NA (Causal) in light of the hard cases, then one should most likely proceed
by restricting it to the conditions described in the easy cases. The easy cases, remember, are cases where
the actual threat would have inevitably gone to completion, regardless of what the agent did. Thus,
roughly, the revised causal asymmetry would be the claim that, in circumstances where the actual process
cannot be stopped, omissions cannot be causes but actions still can. Sharks illustrates the claim about
omissions: given the presence of the sharks, my jumping in wouldn't have stopped the ongoing drowning
process, which would have gone to completion anyway; hence, my failure to jump in isn't a cause of the
child's death. In turn, Removing the Shield (the example from the last section) illustrates the claim about
actions: given the presence of Backup (who would have removed the shield had I not done so myself),
my refraining from removing the shield wouldn't have stopped the ongoing shooting process started by
Assassin, which would have gone to completion anyway; however, my removing the shield is a cause of
Victim's death.
In other words, the revised causal asymmetry would be the claim that, when the actual threat
cannot be stopped, an action can still cause the outcome because it can promote the threat, but an
omission cannot cause the outcome because it cannot promote the threat. If one were to revise the causal
asymmetry this way, one would then have to revise the moral asymmetry accordingly. Roughly, the
revised moral asymmetry would be the claim that, when the actual threat cannot be stopped, the
responsibility for an omission cannot transmit to the outcome but the responsibility for an action can.
Let me sum up the results of the last two sections. I distinguished the easy cases from the hard
cases. I argued that the easy cases clearly support NA (Causal). Then I explained why it might be
thought that the hard cases make trouble for NA (Causal). Although I expressed some reservations about
the hard cases, I argued that, ultimately, the decision whether to revise NA (Causal) in light of those cases
is likely to depend on the answer to the question whether causation is transitive. Finally, I explained how
NA (Causal) could be revised if causation turned out to be transitive.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, I argued for a new moral asymmetry between actions and omissions. I first explained my
reasons for rejecting the old asymmetry thesis that some philosophers have suggested, and I then argued
for a new way of understanding the moral asymmetry that the old asymmetry thesis attempted to rescue.
On this new way of understanding the moral asymmetry, there is a moral asymmetry between actions and
omissions because there is a more fundamental and purely causal asymmetry between actions and
omissions, and because causation plays a fundamental role in the transmission of responsibility.
To conclude, let us examine the results of this chapter in connection with the results of chapter 1.
In chapter 1, I argued for the following thesis:
CDM (A/O): If an action caused an outcome, then the corresponding omission wouldn't have
caused the outcome. Similarly, if an omission caused an outcome, then the corresponding action
wouldn't have caused the outcome. 6
CDM (A/O) is the result of restricting CDM to the case of actions and omissions of agents. In turn, in
this chapter, I argued for the following thesis:
6o Recall that this is short for the claim: "If an action caused an outcome, then, in the closest possible world where
the action doesn't occur, the omission doesn't cause the outcome, and vice-versa: if an omission caused an
outcome, then, in the closest possible world where the omission doesn't obtain (i.e., where an action of the relevant
type obtains), the action doesn't cause the outcome."
NA (Causal): An action can cause an outcome even if the outcome would still have occurred in
the absence of the action. By contrast, an omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome
would still have occurred in the absence of the omission.
The most interesting claim that NA (Causal) makes is the claim about omissions. So let us focus on this
claim:
NA (Causal) [Omissions]: An omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome would still have
occurred in the absence of the omission.
Is there a connection between CDM (A/O) and NA (Causal) [Omissions]? In particular, does one entail
the other?
It is clear that CDM (A/O) doesn't entail NA (Causal) [Omissions]. CDM (A/O) entails that an
omission cannot cause an outcome if the corresponding action would have caused it. But from this it
doesn't follow that, as NA (Causal) [Omissions] claims, an omission cannot cause an outcome if the
outcome would still have occurred if the omission had been absent-i.e., if the corresponding action had
occurred.
In what follows, I show that the converse entailment doesn't hold either: that NA (Causal)
[Omissions] doesn't entail CDM (A/O). This is less obvious, however. For ease of reference, let us
break up CDM (A/O) into two claims:
CDM (A/O) [Claim 1]: If an action caused an outcome, then the corresponding omission
wouldn't have caused the outcome.
CDM (A/O) [Claim 2]: If an omission caused an outcome, then the corresponding action
wouldn't have caused the outcome.
I will show that NA (Causal) [Omissions] entails Claim 2, but it doesn 't entail Claim 1. As a result, NA
(Causal) [Omissions] doesn't entail CDM (A/O).
NA (Causal) [Omissions] entails CDM (A/O) [Claim 21:
(1) NA (Causal) [Omissions]: An omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome would still
have occurred in the absence of the omission.
(2) Suppose that an omission O caused an outcome U.
(3) Then U would not have occurred in the absence of O (that is, if the corresponding action A
had occurred). (From I and 2)
(4) Then A would not have caused U. (From 3)
(5) Then CDM (A/O) [Claim 2] is true: if O caused U, A would not have caused U. (From 2-4)
NA (Causal) [Omissions] doesn 't entail CDM (A/O) [Claim 11:
To see this, let us try to build an argument from the former to the latter and let us then see where the
argument fails:
(1) NA (Causal) [Omissions]: An omission cannot cause an outcome if the outcome would still
have occurred in the absence of the omission.
(2) Suppose that an action A caused an outcome U, and let w be the closest possible world where
A doesn't occur (where the corresponding omission O obtains).
(3) Then the counterfactual: "If O had not obtained, A would have caused U" is true in w.
(From 2)
(4) Then the counterfactual: "If O had not obtained, U would still have occurred" is true in w.
(From 3)
(5) Then 0 doesn't cause U in w. (From I and 4)
(6) Then CDM (A/O) [Claim I] is true: if A caused U, O wouldn't have caused U. (From 2-5)
This argument is fallacious: 3 doesn't follow from 2. Suppose that A caused U in @ (the actual world).
By assumption, w is the closest world to @ where O obtains. But the closest world to w where O doesn't
obtain needn't be @ itself.6' So the counterfactual "If O had not obtained, A would have caused U"
needn't be true in w.
61 S. Yablo draws attention to this feature of counterfactuals in Yablo (1992), p. 416.
Here is an example to illustrate. I water a plant in the actual world and the plant lives. However,
unbeknownst to me, the state of the plant was very delicate, and it required exactly that much water to
survive: less wouldn't have been enough and more would have been too much. Moreover, imagine that I
generally pour a lot more water into my plants: this time I accidentally got distracted and I poured less
than usual. Call the closest possible world to @ where I don't water the plant w. Now consider the world
that is closest to w where I do water the plant. Presumably, this isn't going to be @, but a world in which
I pour a lot more water. Call it w*. w* is a world where my watering the plant doesn't cause the plant to
live, because the plant dies in that world. This shows that 2 doesn't entail 3: my watering the plant
causes the plant to live in @, but it doesn't cause it to live in w*, the closest world to w where I water the
plant.
We have seen that NA (Causal) [Omissions] doesn't entail CDM (A/O) [Claim 1]. Therefore, it
doesn't entail CDM (A/O). Given that, as we have seen, the converse entailment doesn't hold either, it
follows that the theses that I have defended in this and the preceding chapter are logically independent.
U 2
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
1. Introduction
What is the relationship between being morally responsible62 for something and causing it? Plainly, we
are not responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that
we couldnt possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which it seems that we cannot be
assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being responsible for it. But,
doesn't the converse entailment hold? Doesnt being responsible for something entail causing it?
Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be responsible for things that we cause.
In this paper I will argue that this intuition is misguided. I will argue that we can be responsible
for things that we dont cause, and thus being responsible for something does not entail causing it.
Moreover, I will argue that this is so for interesting reasons. By this I mean two things.
First, I will argue that being responsible for something does not entail causing it, even under the
assumption that causation by omission is possible. If, as some philosophers have argued, it were simply
impossible to cause something by omission, then, clearly, responsibility would not require causation.63
For there are things that we are responsible for not in virtue of what we do but in virtue of what we fail to
do, i.e. in virtue of some of our omissions. So, if causation by omission were impossible, there would be
things for which we are responsible without causing them. Following intuition, I will assume that
62 In what follows, I will use the term "responsible" to mean morally responsible.
63 For a recent defense of the view that there is no genuine causation by omission, see Dowe (2001). Note that even
someone like Dowe, who denies the possibility of causation by omission, feels the pressure to bring the causal and
moral realms back in-line to some degree. To this effect, he introduces the term "quasi-causation," and claims that
responsibility requires causation or quasi-causation.
causation by omission is possible. Still, I will argue that being responsible for something does not require
causing it.
Second, in order for the thesis that responsibility requires causation to be an interesting target, it
must be properly restricted. For the unrestricted version faces a serious problem. The problem arises as
follows. The unrestricted version says:
Moral Entails Causal (Unrestricted): For any X, if an agent is responsible for X, it is in virtue of
the fact that he caused X, i.e. it is in virtue of the fact that one of his actions or omissions caused
X.
The "in virtue of the fact that" is there to suggest that, when an agent is responsible for X, he is
responsible because he caused X (although, presumably, this is only taken to be a partial explanation of
why he is responsible: the fact that he caused X is a reason why he is responsible, but there are probably
others).
Now, the following principle seems true:
(P) In order to be responsible for something in virtue of having caused it, one has to be
responsible for the cause itself.
P is plausible because, if one weren't responsible for the cause, then the fact that one caused the effect
wouldn't have any tendency to explain why one is responsible for the effect.
The problem for Moral Entails Causal (Unrestricted) is that, in conjunction with P, it leads to an
infinite regress. This emerges as follows. Suppose that we want to hold an agent responsible for an event
X. Then, Moral Entails Causal (Unrestricted) says that one of the actions or omissions of the agent
caused X. Call that action or omission "Y". Then, P says that the agent is responsible for y.64 But then,
64 I am assuming that it makes sense to hold agents responsible for their own actions and omissions. This is, e.g.,
how J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza use the concept of responsibility in Fischer and Ravizza (1998). See also van
Inwagen (1978). As van Inwagen points out, we much more normally attribute responsibility to agents for events or
states of affairs in the world than for their own actions or omissions. However, we do sometimes say things like "He
cannot be held responsible for his actions, given that he was under the influence of that drug." In this paper, I will
be assuming that the concept of responsibility applies to all of these categories of things.
Moral Entails Causal (Unrestricted) says that one of the actions or omissions of the agent caused Y. Call
that action or omission "Z". And so on. This is a problem because it means that, in order for an agent to
be responsible for something, he must be responsible for an infinite number of things. And, in principle,
it is not easy to see how this could be so.
However, the thesis that responsibility requires causation can be restricted in a way that avoids
this problem. We can, for instance, restrict it to outcomes in the external world (such as a person's death
or a person's being harmed). The thesis that responsibility for outcomes requires causation is widespread
among philosophers.6 5 And it is no mystery why this is so. Clearly, we can only be responsible for what
happens in the external world if we are hooked up to the world in some way. Now, the only way in
which it seems that we could be hooked up to the world is by means of our actions and omissions. And
the only way in which our actions and omissions could hook us up to the world seems to be by means of
what they cause. Thus, the natural thought is that, if we are responsible for an outcome, it must be
because our actions or omissions caused the outcome.
Moreover, we often seem to put this intuitive idea to work in the following way. Imagine that we
believe that a person is responsible for a certain outcome. However, we then find out that nothing that the
person did or failed to do caused the outcome. Then it is likely that we will abandon our belief that the
person is responsible for the outcome. Imagine, for instance, that a sniper and I willingly fire our guns at
the same time in my enemy's direction. My enemy dies and the autopsy reveals that only the sniper's
bullet reached him and killed him. Then we will conclude that I am not responsible for my enemy's
death, although I am responsible for trying to kill him (similarly, I will not be punished for his death,
although I might be punished for a lesser crime, attempted murder). The reason why I am not responsible
for the death is, intuitively, that I didn't cause it, even if I tried. In other words, the reason why I am not
responsible for the death seems to be that my firing my gun, the only thing I did that could have made me
responsible for the death, wasn't a cause of it.
65 It is generally assumed that the only outcomes that agents can be responsible for are the causal consequences of
their actions and omissions. See, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and van Inwagen (1978).
In short, under the assumption that there is causation by omission, the following principle seems
very plausible:
Moral Entails Causal: If an agent is responsible for an outcome, it is in virtue of the fact that he
caused it (some action or omission of his caused it).
In the first part of the paper I will argue that Moral Entails Causal is false. Then, in the second part of the
paper, I will try to do some rebuilding. I will address the questions that the first part naturally gives rise
to, namely: if we can be responsible for outcomes without causing them, then, does this mean that there
is no connection between responsibility and causation? How can we be responsible for what goes on in
the world without being causally connected to the world by our actions and omissions? I will make an
alternative proposal about the relation between responsibility for outcomes and causation, and I will argue
that the alternative proposal is, on reflection, as plausible and as helpful as Moral Entails Causal seemed
to be.
2. The argument against the received view
Imagine the following situation. There was an accidental leak of a dangerous chemical at a high-risk
chemical plant, which is on the verge of causing an explosion. The explosion will occur unless the room
containing the chemical is immediately sealed. Suppose that sealing the room requires that two buttons-
call them "A" and "B'-be depressed at the same time t (say, two seconds from now). You and I work at
the plant, in different rooms, and we are in charge of accident prevention. Button A is in my room, and
button B is in yours. We don't have time to get in touch with each other to find out what the other is
going to do; however, we are both aware of what we are supposed to do. As it turns out, each of us
independently decides to keep reading his magazine instead of depressing his button. The explosion
ensues.
Now consider the following variant of the case. Again, button A is in my room, and I fail to
depress it. This time, however, there is no one in the room containing button B. Instead, a safety
mechanism has been automatically set to depress B at t. When the time comes, however, B becomes
stuck while it's up. Just as in the original case, then, neither button is depressed and the explosion occurs.
Call the two cases "Two Buttons" and "Two Buttons-One Stuck," respectively. The cases differ in the
respect that, in Two Buttons, B isn't depressed because you decided not to depress it, whereas, in Two
Buttons-One Stuck, it isn't depressed because it got stuck.
I will argue that Two Buttons is a case of responsibility without causation, and thus it is a
counterexample to Moral Entails Causal. My argument will take the following form:
(1) I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons.
(2) My failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck.
(3) If my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck, then it
didn't cause it in Two Buttons.
(4) Therefore, my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons. (From (2)
and (3))
(5) No other action or omission of mine caused the explosion in Two Buttons.
(6) Therefore, Moral Entails Causal is false. (From (1), (4) and (5))
In other words, I will argue that I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons but nothing I did or
failed to do caused it. In particular, my failure to depress A didn't cause it. And I will argue that my
failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons by arguing that it didn't cause it in Two
Buttons-One Stuck and that my causal powers with respect to the explosion are the same in the two cases.
I take (5) to be clearly true.66 In the following sections, I take up premises (1) through (3) in turn.
First, however, a note on the methodology is in order. I will be arguing that we should accept the
66 Intuitively, that is. On some views of causation, I caused the explosion by failing to do things that I couldn't
possibly have done. In particular, on views according to which counterfactual dependence is sufficient for
causation, I caused the explosion by failing to cast a spell that would magically prevent it (since, had I cast the spell,
the explosion wouldn' have occurred). But recall that Moral Entails Causal says that, if an agent is responsible for
an outcome, it is in virtue of the fact that some action or omission of his caused the outcome, that is, the fact that
some action or omission of his caused the outcome explains why the agent is responsible for the outcome. Now,
premises in my argument because the price of rejecting them is very high. Now, it might well be that the
price of giving up Moral Entails Causal, the thesis that my argument attacks, is also high (especially
since, as I have granted, Moral Entails Causal is an intuitively plausible and fruitful principle). If so, we
should do whatever comes at the least high price. And, how are we going to know what this is? Here is
where th;e positive proposal of this paper steps in. I will argue that the price of giving up Moral Entails
Causal is actually not high at all, for an alternative principle about the relation between causation and
responsibility is at least as plausible and at least as fruitful. As a result, we shouldn't have qualms about
abandoning Moral Entails Causal.
3. Argument for the first premise
In this section I will argue for premise (1):
(1) I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons.
I find (1) intuitively true.67 In addition, there is a persuasive argument in support of this intuition.
Briefly, the argument goes as follows. If we were to reject (1), then we would have to say that Two
Buttons is a case of moral luck. But it would be wrong to count situations like Two Buttons as situations
of moral luck. Hence, we should accept (1).
Let me explain. A case of moral (good) luck is a case where an agent, who behaves in a way that
is generally conducive to a certain type of harm, is relieved of any responsibility for the harm (even if the
harm ensues) thanks to the obtaining of some circumstances that are outside of the agent's control." For
even if my failure to cast the spell were a cause of the explosion, this would have no tendency to explain why I am
responsible for the explosion, since everybody else's failure to cast a similar spell would be a cause too. Hence, my
point would stand in the end.
67 And other people would too. A.M. Honor6 writes: "ff two huntsmen independently but simultaneously shoot
and kill a third person, or two contractors independently fail to deliver essential building supplies on time, it is
intuitively clear that each should be held responsible for the death or building delay." (Honors (2002)) Two
Buttons strikes me as analogous to Honore's two contractors case.
68 See Nagel (1979), ch. 3, and Williams (1981), ch. 2. There are also cases of moral bad luck, where an agent is
responsible for an outcome partly due to circumstances that are out of his control.
instance, if I fire my gun at my enemy and the bullet is deflected by a gust of wind, but at the same time
he is struck by a lightning and dies, then I am not responsible for my enemy's death, even if I acted badly.
Thus, this is a case of moral luck. Now, if I weren't responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons, then
Two Buttons would be a case of moral luck too. For it would be a case where I am not responsible for the
ensuing harm even if I acted in a morally unacceptable way that is generally conducive to that type of
harm. In addition, I would not be responsible for the harm due to the obtaining of some circumstances
that were out of my control, namely, the fact that B also wasn't depressed.
However, I don't think that we are prepared to accept this as a genuine kind of moral luck. The
first thing to notice is that, if we were to say that I am not responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons,
then we would have to say the same about you. In other words, we would have to say that I am not
responsible because B wasn't depressed, and you are not responsible because A wasn't depressed. Now,
B wasn't depressed because you failed to depress it, and A wasn't depressed because I failed to depress it.
Thus, if we said that Two Buttons is a case of moral luck, we would have to say that, for each of us, the
fact that the other also behaved in a morally unacceptable way (that is generally conducive to a certain
type of harm) is enough to relieve him of responsibility for the harm. But, in Two Buttons, the harm
occurred in virtue of the fact that we behaved badly: had both of us done the right thing, the harm
wouldn't have occurred. Thus, claiming that Two Buttons is a case of moral luck amounts to claiming
that two wrongs that are generally conducive to a certain type of harm can neutralize each other in
circumstances where they are jointly responsible for the occurrence of the harm. And this seems wrong.
In other words, we regard the situation in Two Buttons as one where a purely human failure took
place, and thus we want to assign blame for what happened to the moral agents involved. The fact that
the human failure is traceable to more than one human being does not mean that the agents are relieved of
responsibility; rather, it means that they share responsibility for the bad outcome, just as the members of a
gang share responsibility for a robbery.69
69 This raises the question of how we should distribute the responsibility in cases of joint responsibility, which I will
not try to answer here. Two Buttons is different from ordinary cases of joint responsibility in that what each of the
Contrast this with Two Buttons-One Stuck. In Two Buttons-One Stuck, B wasn't depressed due
to a mechanical-not a human-failure. Intuitively, mechanical failures are the kind of thing that can
give rise to moral luck. Intuitively, in Two Buttons-One Stuck, even though I thought that I could have
prevented the explosion by depressing A, and even if I acted badly in failing to depress A, I was lucky. I
was lucky because, at the moment at which I should have depressed A, B got stuck. The fact that B was
stuck seems to exempt me from responsibility for the explosion. In other words, Two Buttons-One Stuck
strikes us as a typical case of moral luck, where some natural phenomenon that is outside my control
takes away my responsibility for the outcome.70
Two Buttons-One Stuck is similar to cases that philosophers have discussed in the context of the
debate over whether one can be responsible for outcomes that one couldn't have prevented. Here is an
example: I am walking by the beach when I see that a child is drowning. I think I could prevent his
death, but I deliberately refrain from jumping in to attempt the rescue. The child drowns. Unbeknownst
to me, however, there was a patrol of hungry sharks in the water that would have attacked me as soon as I
jumped in, and hence I couldn't have saved the child. Am I responsible for the death of the child under
those circumstances? It seems not. I am responsible for not trying to save the child, but not for his
death.7" Similarly, it seems that, in Two Buttons-One Stuck, I am responsible for not trying to prevent the
explosion, but not for the explosion itself.
agents does is sufficient (independently of what the other agent does) for the outcome. But, if anything, this
provides more reason (not less) to believe that each of the agents is responsible in Two Buttons.
Someone might want to try to say that Two Buttons is a case of collective responsibility without individual
responsibility: a case where a group is responsible but none of the members of the group is. It has been argued that
this phenomenon is possible. However, even if it were, Two Buttons is not likely to be an example. The type of
case where-some people argue-there is collective responsibility without individual responsibility is one where the
behavior of each of the agents is excusable. For instance, D. Cooper has argued that a society where some serious
injustice has become an everyday practice, and where all of the living members of the society have been brought up
to regard it as natural, is a case of collective responsibility without individual responsibility (see Cooper (1972), pp.
88-89). In Two Buttons, however, our individual behaviors aren't excusable.
70 I think that there is moral luck of this sort, and I will be assuming that there is in the context of this paper. It is
possible, however, to hold premise (1) without holding that there is moral luck (by claiming that I am responsible for
the explosion both in Two Buttons and in Two Buttons-One Stuck).
71 This is Fischer and Ravizza's "Sharks" case in Fischer and Ravizza (1998) (1 discuss this case in chapter 2). A
consequence of the fact that I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons is that I can be responsible for
In sum, there seems to be an interesting moral difference between Two Buttons and Two Buttons-
One Stuck: it seems that, whereas I am responsible for the explosion in Two-Buttons, I am not
responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck.72 Now, what explains this difference? In both
cases, I couldn't have prevented the explosion by depressing A, since the other button wasn't going to be
depressed (in one case, because it got stuck; in the other case, because you failed to depress it). Why,
then, am I responsible for the explosion in one case and not in the other? I will return to this question in
section 7. As we will see in the next two sections, it is not because I cause the explosion in one case and
not in the other. It will follow from my arguments in the next two sections that there is no causal
difference between Two Buttons and Two Buttons-One Stuck.
4. Argument for the second premise
In this section I will argue for premise (2):
(2) My failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck.
I will argue that we should endorse (2), or else we would be committed to much more causation by
omission than we are prepared to accept.
Imagine that we said that my failure to depress A did cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One
Stuck. To say that it did is to say that it caused it even if B was stuck and, hence, even if depressing A
wouldn't have prevented the explosion. Had I depressed A and had B not been stuck, then the explosion
outcomes that I couldn't have prevented. (By contrast, Two Buttons-One Stuck and Sharks are cases where I am not
responsible for an outcome that I couldn't have prevented.) How does my claim about Two Buttons square with
what I say in chapter 2? It follows from NA (Causal) from chapter 2 that my failure to depress A isn't a cause of the
explosion in Two Buttons, since it wouldn't have prevented it. I think that this is the right result, and I argue for this
in the next section. Thus, my responsibility for the explosion isn't inherited from my failure to depress A. I will
argue, however, that it is inherited from something else (see sections 6 and 7 below).
72 Pace D. Parfit, who seems to believe that whether another moral agent is present or whether a natural mechanism
is present cannot make a moral difference of the sort I am suggesting. See Parfit (1984), p. 82, and especially fn. 49.
Parfit does not say why he thinks this. He might have been led to believe this after noticing that, as I will be
claiming, whether another moral agent is present or whether a natural mechanism is present cannot make a causal
difference, and then concluding that it cannot make a moral difference. This last step is the step I think we shouldn't
take.
would have been prevented, but my depressing A wouldn't have been sufficient to prevent it. Still, it
would have been a cause. Now, if this is so, we should probably say that an agent's failure to act in the
relevant way caused the outcome in all of the following cases. If a child is drowning but there are sharks
in the water that would have thwarted a rescue attempt, we would have to say that I caused the death of
the child by failing to jump into the water to rescue him, when I couldn't have saved him, given the
presence of the sharks. After all, had I jumped into the water to save him, and had there been no sharks
in the water, I would have saved him. Similarly, we would have to say that a doctor's failing to operate
on a patient with a tumor caused the patient's death, when he couldn't have saved him, for the tumor was
too deep into the patient's brain and thus couldn't be removed. After all, had the doctor operated, and
had the tumor not been so deep into the brain, the patient would have lived. Notice, in particular, that we
would have to say this even if the doctor was fully aware of the fact that the tumor couldn't be removed
(and, in the drowning case, even if I was fully aware of the presence of the sharks). For, presumably, an
agent's epistemic state is irrelevant to the causal powers of his actions and omissions.
The recipe for obtaining implausible results of this type is easy to follow. Take any outcome that
I couldn't have prevented by acting in a certain way, given the existence of an impeding factor. Still, had
I acted that way, and had the impeding factor been absent, the outcome would have been prevented.
Hence, any case of this type will share the structure of Two Buttons-One Stuck. Thus, if we said that I
caused the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck, then we would probably have to say that I caused the
outcome in all of these cases.
Moreover, whether there is one or more than one impeding factor couldn't possibly make a
difference to my causal powers. Hence, the recipe is easily generalizable to cases where many impeding
factors are in play. Here is an example. Suppose that a child is about to drown in the ocean. The only
way to save him now would be by using a super fast boat. Suppose that I am the manufacturer of the only
type of engine in town that could have been part of such a boat. Naturally, though, the engine wouldn't
have been enough: many other materials would have been necessary to build the boat. But, had the
engine, and the wood, and the steel, and the iron, and all the other things necessary to build the boat been
available yesterday, and had we put the parts together in the right way then, we could have saved the child
by using the super fast boat today. If we rejected (2), then, we would have to say that my failure to
provide the engine to build the boat caused the death of the child. But this is extremely implausible.
My claim, then, is that we should accept (2), or else we would be committed to far more
causation by omission than it seems reasonable to accept. In addition, we would be committedi to a lot of
causation by omission of a very peculiar type. Let me explain. When we wonder what the causal history
of a certain phenomenon is, we don't expect to find redundant causes of the phenomenon. This is to say,
we expect every element in the causal history to play an indispensable role, which no other element in the
causal history plays. Suppose, for instance, that we wish to reconstruct the causal history of the shattering
of a window. If we find out that there were two rocks in the neighborhood of the window right before it
broke, each of them with a momentum enough to break the window, then we will naturally regard the two
rocks as competing for one and the same role in the causal history of the window's shattering. We will
want to know, for example, if one of them deflected the other away from its path, or if one of them got to
the window first and, in any of these cases, we will count one of them, but not the other, as a cause. The
reconstruction of the causal history of the shattering would contain a redundancy if it made reference to
both rocks. As a result, we will probably feel that, until we resolve the redundancy, we won't have given
a precise reconstruction of the causal history of the shattering.
There might be exceptions. In particular, some people believe that there are phenomena (or, at
least, there could be phenomena) whose causal history is essentially redundant. These cases are known as
cases of overdetermination.73 An example that is generally offered in the literature as an example of
overdetermination is a window shattering case where two rocks impact the window at exactly the same
time, with the same momentum, and where each of the rocks in isolation from the other would have been
sufficient to break it, and in exactly the same way as it actually did. In that case, both rocks should
probably enter into the reconstruction of the causal history of the shattering, even though each of them
73 By "overdetermination" I mean what some philosophers have called "symmetric overdetermination."
renders the other redundant.74 Now, although some people are inclined to accept the possibility of
overdetermination, the overwhelming majority still regards it as a rare phenomenon. Indeed, it seems that
we would be very surprised to find out that the causal histories of many events that occur are redundant in
this way. However, I will argue that, rejecting (2) would have the implausible consequence that there is
widespread overdetermination, and thus, that redundancy is everywhere.
If my failure to depress A caused the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck (this is to say, if (2)
were false), then, by the same token, B's not being depressed would also be a cause. But each would
have sufficed for the explosion to occur, and thus they would render each other redundant. In the fast
boat case, the boat couldn't have been built unless I provided the fast engine and unless many different
materials were available at the required time. Thus, if the absence of the fast engine and of each of those
materials were all causes of the drowning of the child, the causal history of the drowning would be
multiply redundant. But it is implausible to believe that redundancy is everywhere. Hence, this provides
further reason to accept (2).75
74 At least if we find out that the presence of one rock didn't have any effect on the contribution that the other rock
actually had; otherwise, we might want to count them as joint causes. Imagine, for instance, that the rocks slightly
touch each other right before they hit the window and this slows them down. As a result, the momentum of each of
the rocks when they hit the window wouldn't have been independently sufficient to break the window. If so, the
two rocks jointly caused the shattering.
75 A famous objection to the view that the mental is causally efficacious even though it is not identical to the
physical is that, if such a view were true, then there would be widespread overdetermination. (See Kim (1998), pp.
44-45.) A possible reply in the mental case is to say that the redundancy is only problematic when the redundant
causes are fully distinct, and that mental states and physical states aren't fully distinct because the former supervene
on the latter. Notice, however, that this kind of reply isn't available in the cases that matter to us. For instance, my
failure to provide the fast engine and the absence of wood are fully distinct conditions.
Although most people agree that overdetermination is not widespread, there are a few exceptions. A
notable excep;ion is J. Schaffer. In Schaffer (forthcoming), he argues that overdetermination is everywhere. For
instance, when a big rock hits a window flying northwards, the rock's eastern and western hemispheres (each of
which would have been sufficient to break the window) overdetermine the window's shattering. Schaffer claims that
these cases involve no improbable coincidences or conspiracies because the overdetermining parts are "lawfully
yoked": natural forces hold the parts of the rock together. Thus, there is no good reason to think that
overdetermination is improbable. Notice, however, that the overdetermination that we would be committed to in the
boat case is not of this type: no natural force holds the different parts of the unbuilt boat together. And, even if
Schaffer were right in that overdetermination by lawfully connected parts does not seem improbable, it is clear that
overdetermination by lawfully disconnected parts does seem improbable.
5. Argument for the third premise
Finally, let us turn to the third premise in my argument:
(3) If my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck, then it
didn't cause it in Two Buttons.
My argument for (3) will be based on the fact that the two cases, Two Buttons and Two Buttons-One
Stuck, are relevantly similar. There are differences between them; as I have briefly indicated, they are
enough to ground a moral difference between the cases. But I will argue that the differences that there are
could not plausibly be viewed as mattering causally.
The cases have been laid out in such a way that the essential difference between them is that a
person is in control of button B in one case, but a mechanism is in control in the other. In both cases, B
isn't depressed at the required time, but, in Two Buttons, it is because you failed to depress it, whereas, in
Two Buttons-One Stuck, it is due to a mechanical failure. Hence saying that (3) is false would amount to
saying that whether there is a causal connection between my failure to depress A and the explosion can
depend on whether a person, as opposed to an unconscious mechanism of some sort, is in the other room.
But this is highly implausible. That is, it is highly implausible to believe that the mere fact that a person
is in the other room, as opposed to a machine that behaves in relevantly similar respects as the person
does, might make a difference to my causal powers. The fact that B wasn't depressed certainly matters to
my causal powers, given that B's being depressed was necessary to prevent the explosion. But it seems
that whether B wasn't depressed as a result of a person 'sfailing to depress it or as a result of a
mechanical failure of some sort simply shouldn't be relevant to whether I caused the explosion by failing
to depress A.
Let me illustrate with an analogous example. In order for the example to be sufficiently
analogous, I suggest that we look at a purported case of overdetermination. (The reason for choosing this
type of example is that, as we saw in the last section, cases like Two Buttons-One Stuck have the basic
structure of an overdetermination case in that, were we to say that there is causation, we would thereby
have to say that there is overdetermination). Take the case of the two rocks simultaneously hitting the
window, and imagine that I threw one of the rocks. Now, suppose that we are trying to establish whether
my throwing my rock was a cause of the shattering. Would it matter, for these purposes, whether the
other rock was thrown by another person or by an unconscious mechanism (say, an automated catapult)?
Clearly not. Whether a person or a catapult threw the other rock seems completely irrelevant to the causal
powers of my throw. What does seem to matter is whether the other rock impacted the window (or
whether it was just my rock that impacted it), and how it impacted it (in particular, whether it made any
important difference to the shattering of the window, or whether my rock was responsible for the major
crack that ended in its shattering). But whether all this happened because a sentient being or an
unconscious mechanism threw the other rock is simply irrelevant to whether my throw caused the
shattering.
Similarly, it seems that whether a person was in charge of B in the other room, or whether a
mechanism was, should simply be irrelevant to whether my failure to depress A caused the explosion.
What does seem relevant is whether B was depressed (if it had been depressed, then my failure to depress
A would have been a cause), and what effect B's not being depressed had on the explosion (if depressing
only A had been sufficient to prevent the explosion, then, again, my failure to depress A would have been
a cause). But whether B wasn't depressed as a result of a human failure or as a result of a mechanical
failure seems irrelevant to whether my failure to depress A was a cause of the explosion.76
I have argued that the differences between Two Buttons and Two Buttons-One Stuck do not
matter causally. I would like to conclude my defense of (3) by drawing attention to the fact that the main
76 Could we say that some other difference, which comes hand in hand with the difference between a person and a
machine, is relevant to my causal powers in these cases? How about the difference in the certainty of the outcome?
(The thought is: having a person in the other room makes it less certain whether B will be depressed than if there is
a machine in the room that will inevitably fail.) My reply is twofold. First, in the two rocks case, whether the other
rock was thrown as a result of a mere fluke or as a result of an extremely reliable process is not relevant to whether
my rock caused the window to break. The only thing that matters is whether it was thrown, and in what way, not
how likely its being thrown was at the time that it happened. Second, assume that the person in the other room is
completely determined to do the wrong thing. This still doesn't get me off the hook. Thus, this strategy won't serve
to account for the fact that I am responsible for the explosion in this case. As a result, we would still have to accept
my conclusion, or reject a different premise in my argument.
existing theories of causation are likely to regard the two cases as causally on a par: they are likely to
entail that, either my failure to depress A caused the explosion in both cases, or in neither case. (although
different theories might disagree about whether it is a cause in both cases or in neither case). To see this,
let us quickly review the two main categories of theories of causation.
Traditionally, theories of causation are classified into "regularity" theories and "counterfactual"
theories. Very roughly, and in its simplest version, a regularity theory deems something a cause when it
is sufficient, in the circumstances, and given the laws, for the occurrence of the effect. And, also very
roughly, and in its simplest version, a counterfactual theory deems something a cause when it is necessary
for the effect (in the sense that, if it hadn't happened, the effect wouldn't have happened). A regularity
theory is likely to entail that my failure to depress A is a cause of the explosion in both cases, Two
Buttons and Two Buttons-One Stuck. For my failure to depress A was sufficient, in the circumstances,
and given the laws, for the explosion. Whether there is a person or a mechanism in the other room is
simply irrelevant to the fact that my failure to depress A was sufficient, in the circumstances and given
the laws, for the explosion. A counterfactual theory, by contrast, is likely to entail that my failure to
depress A is a cause in neither case. For, given that the explosion would only have been prevented by
depressing both buttons, and given that the other button wasn't depressed, my failure to depress A was
not necessary for the explosion (the explosion would have occurred even if I had depressed A). Again,
whether the other button wasn't depressed due to a human or a mechanical failure is simply irrelevant to
the fact that my failure to depress A was not necessary for the explosion.
Despite their differences, then, both regularity theories and counterfactual theories are likely to
entail that the two cases are causally on a par. Naturally, there are many varieties of both regularity and
counterfactual theories of causation, and I do not intend for this brief sketch of theories of causation to
span them all. However, it does serve as an indication that the kinds of factors that philosophers have
considered as causally relevant are not the kinds of factors that distinguish Two Buttons from Two
Buttons-One Stuck. As a result, my claim that the two cases are causally on a par does not seem to be
particularly controversial.
This concludes my discussion of the premises of my argument against Moral Entails Causal. To
sum up, my argument has been the following:
(1) I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons.
(2) My failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck.
(3) If my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck, then it
didn't cause it in Two Buttons.
(4) Therefore, my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion in Two Buttons. (From (2)
and (3))
(5) No other action or omission of mine caused the explosion in Two Buttons.
(6) Therefore, Moral Entails Causal is false. (From (1), (4) and (5))
The following emerges from the discussion so far. Let us coin the phrase "causal luck" to refer to
the following phenomenon: two factors that would have been causally efficacious if they had acted alone
cancel each other out (causally) when they occur simultaneously. 77 Then what Two Buttons and Two
Buttons-One Stuck show is that causal luck is more common than moral luck. At least in the case of
omissions, causal luck obtains when, given that the two factors occur simultaneously, a certain abstract
dependence relation that would otherwise have existed between each of the factors and the effect is
absent.7" Moral luck, by contrast, is sensitive to other features of the situation, in particular, it is sensitive
to whether what breaks the dependence between each of the factors and the effect is another moral agent.
As a result, causal luck can occur without moral luck. Hence, there can be responsibility without
causation.79
77 A mundane example is this: two rocks that would have broken a window in the absence of each other collide in
midair and lose their momentum.
78 More precisely, in this chapter I argued that this is so in at least a wide range of cases. In turn, in chapter 2. I
argued for the general claim that, when an outcome doesn't counterfactually depend on an omission, the omission
doesn't cause the outcome. Note that all the cases I discussed in this chapter are "easy" cases (for discussion of the
easy cases and the difference from the hard cases, see section 7 of chapter 2).
79 Although I cannot go into this here, I believe that there are also action cases where this divergence between
causal luck and moral luck occurs. I think there are "mixed" cases too. In particular, some "preemptive
80
6. Towards the new view
What is the relationship between responsibility and causation, if it is not entailment? Before addressing
this question, I will consider a different question that arises naturally in light of the preceding discussion.
As we will see, this will also serve the further purpose of helping us rethink the relationship between
responsibility and causation.
The question that arises in light of the preceding discussion is the following. If, as I have argued,
my failure to depress A did not cause the explosion in Two Buttons (or in Two Buttons-One Stuck, but let
us focus on Two Buttons) and, by similar reasoning, your failure to depress B didn't cause it either, then
what did? Naturally, the chemicals having leaked out of the place where they were stored did, but this
answer isn't fully satisfying: the buttons (in virtue of their not being depressed) seemed to have had
something to do with how the explosion was brought about too. The explosion occurred (partly) because
the buttons weren't depressed (because the preventive mechanism constituted by the pair of buttons
wasn't activated). Hence, the reconstruction of the causal history of the explosion would seem
incomplete if it didn't make any reference to the buttons whatsoever. ° The question is, then, how should
this gap in the causal history of the explosion be filled?
I will suggest that some other condition, not my failure to depress A, and not your failure to
depress B, although one that is closely related to both, caused the explosion in Two Buttons. What is this
other condition? To see what it is, consider first an example with just one agent. Imagine that an
orchestra has delivered a wonderful performance. At the end of the concert, I am expected to clap.
Instead, I remain completely still. As a result, Jim forms the belief that I was rude. What caused Jim's
belief that I was rude? Clearly, it was my failure to clap. What is my failure to clap? It is my failure to
preemption" cases might have this feature. For discussion of preemptive preemption cases, see McDermott (1995)
and Collins (2000).
80 Recall that I am assuming that omissions can be causes. If so, the causal history of an explosion should contain
the failure of the mechanisms that were set to prevent it as well as some "positive" causes.
simultaneously move my left hand and my right hand in particular ways. My failure to simultaneously
move my left hand and my right hand in particular ways obtains just in case either I fail to move my left
hand in particular ways at the required time or I fail to move my right hand in particular ways at the
required time, or both. Had I moved just my left hand, I wouldn't have clapped, and thus Jim would still
have thought that I was rude. Had I moved just my right hand, I wouldn't have clapped either, and thus
Jim would have thought that I was rude too. Jim would only have failed to think that I was rude if I had
moved both of my hands in the ways that clapping requires., 1
Let us represent the different conditions schematically. Let F(L) be my failure to move my left
hand (in the required way, at the required time) and let F(R) be my failure to move my right hand (in the
required ways, at the required time). Then we may represent my failure to clap as F(L A R). F(L A R) is
my failure to both move my left hand and my right hand (in the required way, at the required time), and it
obtains whenever at least one of the individual failures obtains (i.e., it is equivalent to the disjunction of
the individual failures, F(L) v F(R)). F(L A R) should be distinguished from each of the individual
failures, F(L) and F(R), as well as from the condition that results from conjoining the two, F(L) A F(R),
which obtains just in case both individual failures obtain. F(L) A F(R) entails both of F(L) and F(R),
since every world where F(L) A F(R) obtains is a world where F(L) obtains and also a world where F(R)
obtains. In turn, each of F(L) and F(R) entails F(L A R), since every world where F(L) obtains is a world
where F(L A R) obtains and every world where F(R) obtains is a world where F(L A R) obtains.
81 I am oversimplifying, since, presumably, I can clap by moving just one hand. However, we may assume that Jim
would also have thought that I was rude if I had just moved one hand. If so, Jim's belief that I was rude seems to
have been caused by my failure to simultaneously move my right hand and my left hand in particular ways. Also,
one might worry that my failure to clap cannot be fully analyzed in terms of (and, in particular, as the disjunction of)
my failure to move my left hand in certain ways and my failure to move my right hand in certain ways because
clapping requires a certain coordination between the movements of the two hands, not just moving the hands in
certain ways. We can avoid this problem by imagining that there is just one way in which I could have moved my
left hand and my right hand that could have resulted in my clapping, or by imagining that Jim would still have
thought that I was rude if I had moved my hands in any other way.
My claim, then, is that F(L A R) caused Jim's belief that I was rude. F(L A R) obtains in every
world where I fail to move at least one hand. In all and only those worlds, Jim would have believed that I
was rude. Thus, presumably, F(L A R) is a cause of Jim's belief.8 2
I submit that the situation in Two Buttons is analogous. Two Buttons is a case with essentially
the same structure as that of the clapping case, with the only difference that it involves two agents instead
of one. In Two Buttons, the explosion would only have been prevented if we had simultaneously
depressed A and B at t. As a matter of fact, we didn't simultaneously depress A and B (in particular,
neither of us depressed his button). I submit that our failure to simultaneously depress A and B at t
caused the explosion. What is our failure to simultaneously depress A and B at t? It is the condition that
obtains just in case either I fail to depress A at t, or you fail to depress B at t, or both. This condition
obtains in the actual world given that both of us failed to depress our buttons, but it also obtains in worlds
where only one of us fails to depress his button.
If F(A) is my failure to depress A and F(B) is your failure to depress B, our failure to
simultaneously depress A and B can be represented as F(A A B). Just as in the clapping case, F(A A B)
should be distinguished from each of our individual failures, F(A) and F(B), as well as from F(A) A F(B),
the condition that obtains just in case both of us fail to depress our buttons. Instead, F(A A B) obtains
whenever at least one of us fails to depress his button (i.e., it is equivalent to F(A) v F(B)). Also, just as
in the clapping case, F(A A B) is entailed by all of these conditions. And, finally, just as in the clapping
case, there is good reason to believe that it is a cause of the outcome, the explosion. Why? For the same
reason that my failure to clap is likely to be a cause of Jim's forming the belief that I was rude in the
clapping case, namely, the fact that, given the circumstances, the explosion occurs in all and only the
82 Doesn't this commit us to overly disjunctive causes? I think it is no worse (at least, not much worse) to believe
that F(L A R) can be a cause than to believe that any omission, e.g. F(L), can be a cause. F(L A R) obtains just in
case F(L) or F(R) obtains. Similarly, F(L) obtains just in case I don't move my left hand at all or I move it in either
of a number of ways that are not constitutive of clapping.
worlds at which F(A A B) obtains. These include worlds where both of us fail to depress our buttons, but
also worlds where only one of us does.
Let me sum up. The question that I wanted to address in this section was this: If, as my
argument against Moral Entails Causal suggests, my failure to depress A did not cause the explosion in
Two Buttons, and the same goes for your failure to depress B, then what did? Certainly, the two buttons
had something to do with the explosion's coming about. My reply is that our failure to simultaneously
depress A and B did. This is a condition that obtains whenever at least one of us fails to depress his
button.
The question will surely arise: Is it really possible to hold, as I am suggesting, that our failure to
simultaneously depress A and B caused the explosion, but neithei of our individual failures, which entail
it, did? More generally, is the following scenario really possible: X entails Y, Y causes E, but X doesn't
cause E? Yes, there are clear cases of this sort. Here is one. Little Suzy just learned that people are
mortal. In particular, she just learned that Grandpa, who she adores, is going to die someday, and this
made her cry. Now, imagine that, unbeknownst to Suzy, Grandpa just died of a heart attack. The fact
that he died entails the fact that he was mortal. But the fact that Grandpa died didn't cause Suzy to cry:
she didn't cry because Grandpa died (she doesn't even know that he died), but because he is mortal. So it
is possible for X to entail Y, for Y to cause E, but for X not to cause E.
Now, how is this going to help us figure out the relationship between responsibility and
causation? I turn to this question in the following section.
7. Causation as the vehicle of transmission of responsibility
How can I be responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons, if my failure to depress A didn't cause it? I
suggest the following. In Two Buttons, I am responsible for the explosion, not in virtue of the fact that
my failure to depress A caused it (since it didn't), but in virtue of the fact that something for which I am
responsible caused it. In other words, I am responsible for the explosion because there is a cause of the
explosion that I am responsible for. What is this cause of the explosion that I am responsible for? I
submit it's our failure to simultaneously depress A and B. In the last section, I argued that this condition
is a cause of the explosion in Two Buttons. Now I will argue that I am responsible for it."3 It will then
follow that something for which I am responsible caused the explosion in Two Buttons.84
The reason why I think we should say that I am responsible for our failure to simultaneously
depress A and B in Two Buttons is similar to the reason why we should say that I am responsible for the
explosion. As we have seen in section 3, we should say that I am responsible for the explosion in Two
Buttons (and so are you) or else there would be things that no one is responsible for but that depend
exclusively on the morally unacceptable behavior of some moral agents. And this is implausible. Now,
our failure to simultaneously depress A and B depends exclusively on the morally unacceptable behavior
of some moral agents, namely, you and me. Hence we should say that I am responsible for our failure to
simultaneously depress A and B, and so are you. In other words, we should say that each of us is
responsible for this failure. If so, I am responsible for a cause of the explosion in Two Buttons.
By contrast, I am presumably responsible for r1one of the causes of the explosion in Two Buttons-
One Stuck. First, as we have seen, my failure to depress A didn't cause the explosion. Hence, even if I
am responsible for my failure to depress A, such failure wasn't a cause of the explosion. And, second,
just as I am not responsible for the explosion given that B was stuck (as I have pointed out in section 3),
presumably, I am also not responsible for the failure of the two buttons to be simultaneously depressed.
Figuring out precisely why this is so would require an in-depth investigation of the intriguing
phenomenon of moral luck, a task that I cannot pursue here. But the fact remains that B wasn't depressed
due to a mechanical failure, not a human failure, and somehow this seems to take away my responsibility
83 Recall that "responsible" means at least partly responsible. What I will argue is that, just as you and I share
responsibility for the explosion in Two Buttons, we share responsibility for our failure to simultaneously depress A
and B.
84 Why don't I just say the following: I am responsible for the explosion in Two Buttons in virtue of the fact that
something I failed to do entails a cause of the explosion? Because, as we will see, I am hoping that the new
principle will help to account for the moral difference between Two Buttons and Two Buttons-One Stuck. But my
failure to depress A also entails a cause of the explosion in Two Buttons-One Stuck.
for the fact that the two buttons weren't simultaneously depressed. Hence, even if the failure of the two
buttons to be simultaneously depressed caused the explosion (as we saw in the last section), I am not
responsible for that failure. It seems, then, that I am not responsible for any of the causes of the explosion
in Two Buttons-One Stuck.
In sum, I suggest the following principle about the relationship between causation and
responsibility (a principle that helps to explain the moral difference between Two Buttons and Two
Buttons-One Stuck):
Causal Transmits Moral: If an agent is responsible for an outcome, then it is in virtue of the fact
that the agent is responsible for something that caused the outcome.8 5
In other words, according to Causal Transmits Moral, if I am responsible for an outcome, then it doesn't
have to be the case that something that I did or failed to do caused the outcome, but it does have to be the
case that I am responsible for one of the outcome's causes. The outcome's cause that I am responsible for
might be an action or omission of mine, but it can also be, as in Two Buttons, the collective behavior of a
group of agents.
Note that Causal Transmits Moral is restricted to outcomes, just as Moral Entails Causal was.
This prevents Causal Transmits Moral from leading to an infinite regress (if it weren't thus restricted,
then it would follow that, in order for an agent to be responsible for something, he would have to be
responsible for one of its causes, and for one of the cause's causes, and so on). Given that it is restricted
to outcomes, Causal Transmits Moral does not entail that one must be responsible for an infinite number
of causes of an outcome in order to be responsible for the outcome.86
" Just as in Moral Entails Causal, the causal connection is also intended to be a partial explanation of the fact the
agent is responsible for the outcome. Presumably, other conditions are required, such as, roughly, the fact that the
agent could foresee that something that he is responsible for would likely cause the outcome.
86 Just as my individual failure to depress A isn't an outcome, our joint failure to simultaneously depress A and B in
Two Buttons isn't an outcome. Hence, Causal Transmits Moral doesn't say anything about it. For all Causal
Transmits Moral says, I might be responsible for our joint failure without being responsible for any of its causes.
How am I responsible for our joint failure, then? As I pointed out, an answer to this question will have to rely on an
account of the conditions under which there is moral luck and the conditions under which there is no moral luck.
Independently of the two cases that have occupied us, Two Buttons and Two Buttons-One Stuck,
Causal Transmits Moral is an intuitively plausible principle about the relation between responsibility for
outcomes and causation. On the face of it, we can only be responsible for an outcome if we are
responsible for one of its causes. For instance, it seems that I wouldn't be responsible for a death by
shooting unless I were responsible for the bullet's piercing the person's heart, or for some other
contributing cause, such as the fact that the person was standing in front of the gun.
Moreover, not only does Causal Transmits Moral seem plausible, but it also appears to be as
fruitful as Moral Entails Causal seemed to be. The paper started out with the remark that Moral Entails
Causal appears to explain my lack of responsibility in cases like the following: I shoot at my enemy and
miss; however, at the same time, a sniper shoots the bullet that kills him. Intuitively, I am not responsible
for my enemy's death, and Moral Entails Causal seemed to explain why: I could only be responsible for
his death in virtue of having shot a bullet at him, but my bullet didn't cause his death; hence, I am not
responsible for his death. I have argued that Moral Entails Causal is false. However, its substitute Causal
Transmits Moral could explain equally well why I am not responsible in this case. Given that I am not
responsible for any of the causes of the death (e.g., the sniper's shooting, or my enemy's standing within
the sniper's shooting range), it then follows from Causal Transmits Moral that I am not responsible for
the death.
We have seen that Causal Transmits Moral is an initially plausible way of understanding the
relation between responsibility for outcomes and causation. In addition, it is an improvement over Moral
Entails Causal in that it does not overlook cases like Two Buttons, where, arguably, an agent is
responsible for an outcome without causing it. Finally, it is as useful as Moral Entails Causal seemed to
be in that it successfully accounts for the lack of responsibility of an agent for an outcome in cases where
he is not responsible for any of its causes. I conclude that there is good reason to believe that Causal
Transmits Moral successfully captures the relation between responsibility and causation.
8. Conclusions
What lessons should we draw from all this? One lesson we should draw is the following. Agents are
responsible for what happens in the external world in virtue of how they interact with it--by means of
their actions and omissions. However, their actions and omissions can make them responsible for things
by virtue of more than their causal powers: they can make agents responsible for things by virtue of the
causal powers of larger collective behaviors that those actions and omissions are part of.87
Another lesson we should draw concerns the general way in which to regard the concepts of
responsibility and causation in relation to each other. There is a strong temptation to regard causation as a
condition on responsibility. Quite generally, being responsible for an outcome tends to be associated
with, roughly, intentionally (or negligently) causing the outcome.8" If, as I have claimed, Moral Entails
Causal is false, then this is a mistake: one can be responsible for an outcome without even causing the
outcome. It follows that we shouldn't view the relation between responsibility and causation as a kind of
entailment relation. How should we view it, then? If, as I have argued, Causal Transmits Moral is true,
then causation should be rather viewed as the vehicle of transmission of responsibility. This is to say, in
order for an agent to be responsible for an outcome, there must be a causal link between an earlier thing
(event, state of affairs, etc.) and the outcome along which the responsibility of the agent was transmitted.
To conclude, let us examine the results of this chapter in connection with the results of the
previous chapters.
In the previous two chapters, the relation between causation and responsibility was an important
focus of discussion. In chapter I (section 6), I appealed to the connection between causation and
responsibility for outcomes to show that CDM helps explain the lack of responsibility of agents in some
87 In the jargon of collective action and collective responsibility, it is possible to have individual responsibility
without individual causation, as long as there is a specific kind of collective causation.
88 For instance, J. Feinberg analyzes "being responsible for a harm" as having acted or failed to act in such a way
that (a) one could foresee (or should have foreseen) that the action or omission was likely to lead to the harm, (b) the
action or omission caused the harm, and (c) the causal connection between the action or omission and the harm was
not deviant. (Feinberg ( 970))
cases of moral luck (in particular, in cases like Switch-with-Main-Track-Unexpectedly-Connected). I
claimed that, in such cases of moral luck, CDM supports the claim that the agent's action doesn't cause
the en-uing outcome, and this, in turn, explains why the agent isn't responsible for the outcome. Now,
what warrants this second inference? Why does the fact that the agent's action doesn't cause the outcome
explain why the agent isn't responsible for the outcome? In light of the results of the present chapter, we
can see that it would be a mistake to say that what warrants that inference is the principle according to
which being responsible for an outcome requires causing the outcome, for this principle is false. That is,
it would be a mistake to think that it follows from the fact that the agent's action didn't cause the outcome
(and from the fact that nothing else the agent did or failed to do caused the outcome) that the agent isn't
responsible for the outcome. However, the principle that I defended in this chapter--the principle that
causation is required for the transmission of responsibility to outcomes-can explain equally well why
the agent isn't responsible for the outcome in such cases of moral luck, on the basis that the agent's action
doesn't cause the outcome. For, if the agent's action doesn't cause the outcome, then (given how the
cases are set up) there is no cause of the outcome that the agent is responsible for in those cases, and thus,
there is nothing from which the responsibility for the outcome can be inherited. As a result, the principle
that causation is required for the transmission of responsibility to outcomes helps explain the fact that the
agent isn't responsible for the outcome in those cases.
In chapter 2, I explicitly discussed the relation between causation and responsibility. As a result,
some of the results of that chapter are importantly connected to the results of the present chapter. In
particular, in section 3 of chapter 2 1 argued for the following principle:
TR (Causal): An agent's responsibility for X transmits to an outcome Y iff X causes Y (and the
usual provisos obtain).
Where "the usual provisos" included, for instance, that the agent could foresee (or should have foreseen)
that X was likely to be followed by Y (or an outcome of Y's type). I wasn't particularly concerned with
laying out the provisos that, together with causation, are (jointly) sufficient for the transmission of
responsibility to outcomes, for the cases I focused on in that chapter were ones were, intuitively, those
provisos were met. Rather, my arguments in that chapter focused on the claim that makes causation a
necessary condition for the transmission of responsibility to outcomes, which follows from TR (Causal):
TR (Causal) [Necessity Claim]: An agent's responsibility for X transmits to an outcome Y only if
X causes Y.
In turn, the principle that I argued for in this chapter is the following:
Causal Transmits Moral: If an agent is responsible for an outcome, it is in virtue of the fact that
the agent is responsible for something that caused the outcome.
Under the assumption that the responsibility for outcomes is inherited from other things, these
principles amount to the same thing. As a result, the view of the relation between responsibility for
outcomes and causation that I argued for in the last two chapters is essentially the same view. However,
each of the chapters is concerned with securing different aspects of that view. In chapter 2, I was
particularly concerned with showing that no notion of dependence has the same ties to responsibility that
causation has (e.g., counterfactual dependence doesn't). In this chapter, by contrast, I was particularly
concerned with clarifying the form that these ties between causation and responsibility take. This is to
say, although both arguments are argumert[s for the view that causation is required for the transmission of
responsibility to outcomes, they emphasize and defend different aspects of that view. While one attempts
to establish that causation is required for the transmission of responsibility to outcomes (no other notion
of dependence is), the other attempts to establish that causation is required for the transmission of
responsibility to outcomes (not for the existence of responsibility for outcomes itself). As a result, the
arguments in the two chapters complement each other.
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